United Nations S/2017/856

Security Council

Distr.: General
13 October 2017

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Letter dated 8 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) Group, a cross-regional group of 25 States that advocates greater accountability, coherence and transparency on the part of the Security Council, I would like to welcome the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507) revising an earlier note (S/2010/507) and emphasize the importance of the efforts of Japan in chairing the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions. We thank all members of the Informal Working Group for their work leading to the adoption of the revised note on 30 August, and in particular Japan for its continuous work and perseverance during the negotiations.

The ACT Group would like to underline the importance of implementing new provisions contained in the note, which are in line with provisions advocated by the Group regarding Security Council working methods.

The ACT Group very much welcomes the comprehensiveness of the revised note, which integrates the 13 presidential notes adopted since 2010. Considering the most recent of these notes, S/2016/619, the Group appreciates the changes made to allow incoming elected members of the Council to be better prepared and the efforts undertaken to enhance the appointment process of the Chairs of subsidiary bodies.

With regard to the drafting process of outcome documents of the Council, the ACT Group commends the provisions regarding co-penholdership, the encouragement to leave sufficient time for delegations to consider drafts and the holding of at least one round of discussions with all Council members.

New provisions aimed at better planning of the Council's business, such as discussing the monthly programme of work with other Council members well in advance, encouraging briefers to be succinct and direct, making more effective use of "Other matters" and suggesting elements to the press, are very welcome and necessary. The possibilities provided to the Peacebuilding Commission to participate in the work of the Council (para. 95) are further positively noted.

Concerning the format of open debates, the ACT Group welcomes the Council's commitment to take steps to improve its focus and interactivity (para. 43). It encourages the Council to follow this commitment closely and to provide pathways towards conducting open debates in a more effective and interactive manner. In this regard, the Group welcomes the recognized importance of concept notes (para. 40). In future revisions, we hope that the Council, besides drafting

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concept notes, will also consider a timely distribution of those notes in order to provide Member States with sufficient time for preparation.

The ACT Group also welcomes the efforts to enhance the dialogue with non-Council members and bodies, especially with regard to the importance of annual joint consultative meetings and informal dialogues with the Peace and Security Council of the African Union for the first time. The considerations of Security Council missions and joint missions with, for example, the African Union are also positive. However, the Group encourages Council members to hold briefings about conducted missions in a timely, inclusive and comprehensive manner, providing relevant and substantial information as well as key insights gathered.

Regarding the Council's annual report, while the ACT Group has continuously advocated that it be made more substantial and analytical and thus commends paragraph 139 of the revised note (S/2017/507), it regrets the lack of progress.

The ACT Group hopes that the revised note will bring about positive results for a more transparent, efficient and accountable Security Council. In order to make the note and the suggestions therein meaningful and effective, the Group calls upon the Council to implement these measures in a consistent, serious and transparent manner.

The ACT Group remains committed to contributing to the overall discussion regarding working methods and interaction between the Council and the wider membership. In this respect, it refers to the statement by the President of the Security Council of 30 October 2015 (S/PRST/2015/19), in which the Council committed to holding an annual open debate on its working methods. We ask for this practice to be continued.

I would appreciate your having the present letter circulated to the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Jürg **Lauber**
Ambassador

United Nations S/2017/857

Security Council

Distr.: General
12 October 2017
English
Original: French

Letter dated 10 October 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), which was established by the Security Council in its resolution 350 (1974) and most recently extended by the Council in its resolution 2361 (2017).

Following the necessary consultations, I would like to inform you of my intention to appoint Major General Francis Vib-Sanziri (Ghana) as the Head of Mission and Force Commander of UNDOF. He will succeed Major General Jai Shanker Menon (India), who completed his assignment on 30 September 2017. I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to Major General Menon for his dedication and effective leadership of UNDOF.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

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Security Council

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12 October 2017
English
Original: French

Letter dated 12 October 2017 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 10 October 2017 (S/2017/857) concerning your intention to appoint Major General Francis Vib-Sanziri (Ghana) as the Head of Mission and Force Commander of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the intention expressed in your letter.

(*Signed*) François **Delattre**

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United Nations S/2017/859

Security Council

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12 October 2017

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Report of the Secretary-General on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 33 of Security Council resolution 2316 (2016), in which the Council requested an annual report on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia.

2. The report covers major developments since my previous report of 7 October 2016 (S/2016/843) through 30 September 2017. The report is based on information provided by the United Nations system, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and Member States and regional organizations, including the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

II. Main developments, trends and considerations regarding piracy off the coast of Somalia

A. Major developments and trends during the reporting period

3. During the reporting period, efforts to minimize acts of Somali piracy continued thanks to the efforts of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia to foster governance and the rule of law within Somalia, the physical presence of international naval forces and the observance of the IMO *Best Management Practices for Protection against Somalia-based Piracy* by the shipping industry. However, a slight increase in piracy activities between March and June 2017 pointed to the root causes as not being fully addressed. In October 2016, there had been an attempt to attack the chemical tanker *Korea*, travelling 300 nautical miles east off the Somali coast, outside the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor, but the attempt failed after an exchange of gunfire with the ship's security forces led to the suspected pirates fleeing the scene. From May 2012 until March 2017, no merchant vessel had been successfully attacked by Somali pirates.

4. During March and April 2017, six successful pirate attacks occurred involving the hijacking for ransom of cargo ships and dhows, including the *Aris 13*, the *Casayr II-No. 30*, the *Al Kausar* and the *Salama*. In April 2017, Chinese and Indian naval forces thwarted an attack on the *OS-35* and, later the same month, Chinese naval

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forces and the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) prevented an attack on the *Al Heera*. Local authorities in Puntland and Galmudug contributed to hostage negotiations and the release of the crew of the *Aris 13* in March, and of the crew of the *Al Kausar* in April, as well as assisted with identifying the apprehended suspects. Twenty-two unsuccessful attacks or suspicious maritime activities were recorded from March to 30 September 2017. Of the 29 attempted or successful attacks during the reporting period, only 2 were against fishing vessels.

5. The hijackings in 2017 began four months after NATO terminated its counter-piracy operations (Ocean Shield) off the coast of Somalia. According to the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction risk assessment, which is a major source of maritime threat assessments, the spike in recent incidents may imply that piracy networks have retained the capability and intent to commit acts of piracy, but were dissuaded from carrying them out by the international naval presence, which includes the European Union, the Combined Maritime Forces and the independent naval forces of China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and Turkey, among others, in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin. The European Union is reviewing the continuation of its naval presence (Operation Atalanta) after 2018. Withdrawing that presence may present increased opportunities for piracy.

B. Addressing root causes

6. The recent attacks demonstrate that the underlying conditions fuelling piracy have not changed, and that piracy networks are still active. Pirate groups remain opportunistic, given the relative ease with which operatives may source weapons and skiffs, making it an option with a low threshold for entry. Several factors add to the risk of a resurgence in piracy activities, including: coastal communities' perceptions of weak coastal and marine resources protection by federal, international and local authorities, especially with regard to illegal fishing by foreign vessels; the ease of recruitment of potential pirates and the financing of attacks as a result of strong criminal networks operating onshore and internationally; the weakness of the institutional capacities and legal frameworks that identify, capture, prosecute and convict suspected pirates and their accomplices; and the lack of alternative income-generation opportunities for affected coastal communities. The perception of a more peaceful environment off the coast of Somalia, the recent favourable weather conditions in the pre-monsoon period and the ongoing humanitarian crisis within Somalia may also have prompted the recent attacks.

7. In addition, a number of external factors contribute to the persistent risk. Commercial ships are not adhering to the *Best Management Practices*, and are deviating from the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor, taking increased risks and reducing their usage of private security personnel. In addition, there is weak information-sharing on the part of the international community, regional instability, and the fact that pirates are possibly viewing the current environment as permissive owing to the recent reduction in the international naval presence. As long as those external and internal conditions remain, so will the risk of further attacks off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.

III. Development of counter-piracy efforts within Somalia

A. National legal and policy frameworks

8. The Federal Government of Somalia has been developing a policy framework for the Somali Coast Guard, with technical assistance from the United Nations

Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the European Union Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity-Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor, now rebranded as EUCAP Somalia), under the Somali Maritime Resource and Security Strategy overseen by the Maritime Security Coordination Committee. The Federal Government has also been working towards a revision of its Maritime Code, and the establishment of a Maritime Administration Department under the Ministry of Ports and Marine Transport, with the assistance of IMO. The new Department will aid the Federal Government in undertaking its flag, port and coastal State maritime responsibilities.[1]

9. Somalia, as a party to the Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), which was the first international agreement to target illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, has requested assistance with its implementation. Under a technical cooperation project with FAO, Somalia will update its information on current practices, procedures and laws concerning ports, flags and coasts; undertake a national gap analysis and needs assessment; review related international instruments and existing regional coordination mechanisms; and develop a national strategy and action plan. The FAO capacity development workshop held in April 2017 has helped Federal Government representatives formulate national strategies and action plans for improving the country's compliance with the agreement.

B. Capacity-building

10. During the reporting period, the Federal Government and regional administrations continued to build their maritime security capacities, with assistance from international partners, in conjunction with the United Nations trust fund to support initiatives of States countering piracy off the coast of Somalia. The first of a series of planned maritime operations centres became operational in Berbera, under the command of the "Somaliland" coastguard, with assistance from Oceans Beyond Piracy, EUCAP Somalia and the Global Maritime Crime Programme of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The centres are designed to offer Somali maritime institutions greater situational awareness and improved communications between local maritime security institutions and international naval forces operating in high-risk coastal areas.

11. The maritime law enforcement authorities in "Somaliland", Puntland and other coastal regions across Somalia continued to develop their maritime security and justice sectors, with assistance from UNODC and EUCAP Somalia. The UNODC Global Maritime Crime Programme provided in-country maritime law enforcement, engineering and communications mentors who delivered on-the-job training and mentoring to Somali maritime police and coastguard units. Somali maritime police also benefitted from advanced training in Seychelles on visit, board, search and seizure operations under the Programme. Mentors routinely reviewed security conditions at Somali prisons to reduce the risk of escape or mistreatment, especially for prisoners transferred under the Piracy Prisoners Transfer Programme and other

[1] A flag State is one in which a vessel is registered or licensed and under whose laws the vessel operates; a port State is one which holds internationally agreed jurisdiction for the inspection of foreign ships operating outside national ports with regard to their compliance with the requirements of international conventions; a coastal State is one that is not landlocked and is responsible for territorial waters or a territorial sea out to 12 nautical miles, as defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

high-risk offenders. The Transfer Programme supports prison operations in Hargeysa, "Somaliland", and in Garoowe, Puntland.

12. UNODC continued its multi-year programme of training, procurement and construction work at the Mogadishu prison and court complex, which will be the most technologically advanced and secure prison facility in Somalia. The complex will provide a secure environment for the trials of high-risk prisoners, such as pirates, terrorists and former combatants. During the reporting period, construction work progressed on a high-security cell block, a court complex, accommodation for judges and other administrative buildings. Security and information management training for Somali custodial officers continued with a view to improving their professionalism and the security of the complex.

13. During the reporting period, three new purpose-built patrol boats were procured and delivered by UNODC to the Maritime Police Unit of the Somali Police Force in Mogadishu. The skiffs are better suited to the rough sea conditions off Mogadishu than the dhows they replaced, enabling the Maritime Police Unit to patrol the coast 365 days a year. The Unit now regularly patrols the Mogadishu harbour and the adjacent coastline. The Unit also supported the maritime forces of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in patrolling the seaward approaches to Aden Adde International Airport (formerly known as Mogadishu International Airport).

14. In Puntland, construction of the new headquarters for the Boosaaso port police, which started in 2015, was completed in 2017 and handed over to the police and the Minister for Maritime Transport, Ports and Maritime Crime Prevention. It will serve as a training and operations centre for port police. With assistance from UNODC, the Boosaaso port police have updated their equipment and communications infrastructure in order to facilitate the regular interdiction of vessels used to smuggle people and weapons. UNODC also procured two purpose-built patrol boats for the Boosaaso port police to replace existing skiffs to give the police increased patrol range.

15. The "Somaliland" coastguard updated its sea operations with radio operator training and other support from the UNODC Global Maritime Crime Programme. The training and mentoring efforts are credited with contributing to the coastguard's successful interdiction of illegal fishing vessels and human smugglers. During the reporting period, UNODC engineering mentors assisted in making five patrol boats operational, and will continue training and mentoring for the remainder of 2017.

C. Community issues

16. Somali waters have the potential to be as lucrative as they are vast. They contain rich fisheries that attract fishing fleets from all over the world. The illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing narrative is often stated to justify pirates' actions. However, only 2 of the 29 vessels involved in maritime incidents during the past year were fishing vessels. Livelihood projects such as coastal development and microfinance loans (e.g., the Shuraako programme) are offered as viable revenue-generating alternatives by non-government entities. FAO, UNODC and Secure Fisheries have also supported such efforts to date. The implementation of a component of the European Union-funded Programme to Promote Regional Maritime Security with FAO aims to promote proper and transparent licensed and regulated fishing with regional States to improve the livelihoods of people in coastal communities.

17. In his remarks to the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia in July 2017, the Minister for Fisheries and Marine Resources of the Federal Government of Somalia, Abdirahman M. Abdi Hashi, emphasized the importance of supporting the Federal Government's judicial capacity and its current efforts to address the issue of

illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, which he characterized as having devastating implications for the alleviation of poverty in Somalia. The Minister highlighted the ongoing work of the Federal Government with federal member states in addressing the lack of economic opportunities, especially through new projects that targeted youth. He acknowledged the need for support to the Federal Government in addressing maritime crime, especially within the Galmudug region.

18. As part of the effort to address the complex linkages between illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and piracy, the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources continued to identify fishing activities in its exclusive economic zone through information collected from various sources, with assistance from FAO. During the reporting period, the European Union shared with the Somali Ministry information collected by EU NAVFOR vessels on sightings of fishing vessels operating in the exclusive economic zone of Somalia, and in 2016 Somalia became the eighth member of the FISH-i Africa task force, a group of countries in the western Indian Ocean that share information in order to combat and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing activities in the region. Somali authorities used that information to halt the activities of some of the vessels identified. However, a weak legal framework and inadequate enforcement capacities often prevented effective follow-up action by the authorities.

IV. International cooperation

A. Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia

19. The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia held its 20th plenary session in Mauritius from 5 to 7 July 2017, under the theme "Leaving a lasting legacy for the region". The plenary session was attended by the following countries: Australia, China, Denmark, Djibouti, Greece, France, India, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mauritius, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. The Somali delegation included representatives from the Federal Government and the federal member states of Galmudug, Puntland, HirShabelle and the Interim South-West Administration, and from "Somaliland". Many other international, regional and private sector organizations also attended. It was co-hosted by the Indian Ocean Commission under the Chairmanship of Seychelles.

20. The Contact Group remains a vital mechanism and point of contact for the international coordination of all States, international and regional organizations and non-State actors involved in addressing piracy off the coast of Somalia in line with Security Council resolution 1851 (2008). The Contact Group's plenary session reiterated the importance of its working groups and other groups when implementing the work of the Group. The key agreements made by the Contact Group during its plenary session are detailed below.

21. The Contact Group remains committed to the objective of "zero seafarers and zero ships" in the hands of Somali pirates, through the continued efforts of the international community. To achieve that objective, six key elements remain: (a) deterrence, monitoring and maritime surveillance and patrols at sea; (b) compliance with the *Best Management Practices*; (c) legally deployed armed guards on board merchant vessels after the conclusion of a risk assessment; (d) reporting networks to establish adequate maritime situational awareness; (e) the finalization of a legal framework to enable the arrest and prosecution of suspected pirates; and (f) the disruption of onshore pirate networks and financiers.

22. The Contact Group acknowledged the work of the International Seafarers Welfare and Assistance Network and the Maritime Piracy Humanitarian Response Programme, as well as the Contact Group's Piracy Survivor Family Fund, which provides funds for the survivors of Somali piracy and their families so as to enable them to obtain a range of support during and after captivity. The Contact Group recognized the need to continue supporting those initiatives and contributing funds to them, acknowledging that piracy survivors need post-trauma intervention, and that many families have fallen into poverty in the absence of their income sources.

23. The Contact Group supported the outcome of the third London Conference on Somalia, held on 11 May 2017, and the commitment of the Federal Government and the federal member states of Somalia to develop their maritime security capabilities with a capable coastguard function and appropriate anti-piracy legislation.

24. The Contact Group noted the efforts of the Federal Government, the federal member states, "Somaliland", and regional organizations aimed at eliminating piracy activities off the coast of Somalia, in the Gulf of Aden and in the wider Indian Ocean. Of note are the respective achievements against piracy of the Puntland and Galmudug local authorities, which helped to free the crews of the *Aris 13* and the *Al Kausar*. The Contact Group called upon the Federal Government and federal member states to use all possible influence on Somali clans and communities to obtain the release of all hostages. The Contact Group also considered the need to provide support for seafarers held hostage, both during and after captivity, and for their families.

25. The Contact Group commended the establishment of a regional centre for operational coordination in Seychelles on 1 July 2017, and the establishment of the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre in Madagascar, in line with the Djibouti Declaration on Maritime Safety and Security in the Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean Region of 2016. The new centres will augment the existing Djibouti Code of Conduct information network. The Contact Group also acknowledged regional African efforts to cooperate in tackling piracy and related maritime crimes, in particular through the conclusion of the negotiations over the African Union Lomé Charter in October 2016, and the adoption of the Jeddah Amendment to the Djibouti Code of Conduct in January 2017.

26. The Contact Group noted the threat posed by unregulated floating armouries to maritime security, and the paper presented by India entitled "Proposed draft guidelines for floating armouries to the Maritime Safety Committee" that urged IMO to take early action to reduce that threat. The Contact Group also noted industry concerns with regard to the threat to seafarers and ships from non-piracy actions in the Bab al-Mandab strait resulting from the recent Shared Awareness and Deconfliction threat assessment. Those waters, including off the Gulf of Aden and the southern Red Sea, remain critical international trade and supply routes. The Contact Group acknowledged the productive efforts of the Maritime Security Coordination Committee on coordinating the plethora of maritime issues, while noting its need to meet more regularly, which was followed up on by members of the Committee at their annual meeting on 31 July.

27. The Contact Group continued to draw upon its membership network to galvanize international and regional responses to address changing threat conditions in the region. The Contact Group agreed that future Chairs should have a mandate lasting one term of no fewer than two years and should come from the region. The Contact Group will also deliver a strategic communications plan to strengthen its reputation and profile. In addition, it will establish better channels of information and communication for all its members to ensure better access to information on threats and to make progress on counter-piracy work, while highlighting regional successes and contributions to deterrence by relevant action groups.

B. United Nations trust fund to support the initiatives of States countering piracy off the coast of Somalia

28. The trust fund to support the initiatives of States countering piracy off the coast of Somalia, established in 2010 by the Contact Group, continued to provide Somalia and other Indian Ocean regional States with financial assistance to strengthen their judicial capacity to combat piracy. The members of the Board of the trust fund for 2016/17 were Djibouti, Germany, the Netherlands (with Norway), Japan, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was elected as an observer.

29. On 5 July 2017, the Board held its 19th meeting in Mauritius, under the chairmanship of the Department of Political Affairs of the Secretariat. It established new project funding proposal guidelines (see para. 33 below) and approved three new projects amounting to $741,564. Project No. 85 ($119,091) will provide support to the Contact Group's Law Enforcement Task Force activities, with the support of UNODC. Project No. 86 ($380,920) will provide support to address maritime crime in Galmudug, Somalia, with the support of UNODC. Project No. 87 ($241,553) will provide support to a piracy prosecution readiness plan in Seychelles. The Governments of Seychelles and Norway stressed the importance of the project, while the Board determined, on the counsel of Federal Government, that a similar project should be undertaken in Somalia as well. While the Board approved the project, the disbursement of funds will not take place until enough new contributions have been received. During the reporting period, several projects encountered delays as a result of the complex security and political environment in Somalia. Implementation remained ongoing through Board-approved extensions.

30. Since December 2012, the trust fund has received a total of $14,006,227 from 18 donors. As at 31 May 2017, the trust fund had a total balance of $616,753. For 2016, the delivery rate on project expenditures by participating organizations was 75.25 per cent, which was notably higher than the 65.98 per cent delivery rate in 2015 and the delivery rate of 37.64 per cent in 2014. Notable trust fund project achievements reported in late 2016 included the registration of 4,468 fishers and 1,470 fishing vessels from eight coastal districts in Puntland, 1,244 fishers and 156 vessels in Mudug and Jubbaland, and 1,244 fishers in "Somaliland". The registrations have enabled authorities to distinguish legitimate fishers from pirates. Trust fund projects also contributed to an increased number of patrols in Somali waters, which enabled authorities in "Somaliland" to interdict at least 51 illegal fishing expeditions and 1 illegal weapons shipment. The projects also allowed Boosaaso port police in Puntland to interdict illegal shipments of fuel from Yemen. In 2017, a trust fund project enabled Maritime Police Units to launch patrols of Somali waters around Mogadishu following a 20-year hiatus.

31. However, progress was slower in the south of Somalia, where political challenges and insecurity delayed a project intended to strengthen the capacity of the judiciary to conduct piracy trials, as well as the reconstruction of the Benadir court complex that was attacked by Al-Shabaab in April 2013. Challenges also remain in the area of piracy prosecutions, to which the trust fund allocates approximately 19 per cent of its funds. While progress has been made over the past few years in the arrest, transfer, prosecution, detention and conviction of piracy suspects after trial, pirate kingpins remain at large and criminal networks continue to operate. Those challenges underscore the importance of the international community's continued support of the trust fund's work in that vital area.

32. At their meeting on 5 July, trust fund Board members noted that the main trend in maritime piracy during March and April 2017 was the hijacking of large commercial vessels, and noted the real risk that hijackings could resume. It also noted the expanding scope of hijackings for ransom of smaller dhows and fishing vessels beyond the territorial waters of Somalia. The Board was of the view that those developments indicated that the progress made in addressing piracy, while significant, remained fragile and reversible.

C. Strategic review of counter-piracy projects in Somalia and the region

33. The strategic review of trust fund project No. 78, carried out by Bauman Global LLC at the request of Board members, included an assessment of trust fund-supported projects to determine if they aligned with the changing piracy context. In addition, the review identified programmatic gaps and how the trust fund or other actors might be able to fill them. The review was completed in January 2017 and its findings were approved by the Board in July 2017. The findings noted that new projects should meet some or all of criteria set out below.

- Encourage international cooperation against pirate kingpins.
- Encourage other Somali development mechanisms, drawn from the national development plan for Somalia, to produce targeted programmes for the prevention of piracy.
- Fund small pilot projects in neglected or underserved areas in regions such as Himan and Heeb and Galmudug. The projects should be designed to avoid recruitment to piracy and ensure a path to handover and sustainability.
- Support research, analysis, monitoring and evaluation to establish effective piracy prevention approaches.

Board Members discussed the findings and agreed on a moderate shift in focus for future trust fund projects, in which funded projects played a more catalytic role in piracy prevention, in line with the recommended criteria above.

V. Strategic maritime security activities

A. International capacity-building

34. The Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea of the Office of Legal Affairs is continuing to implement its capacity-building programme for Somalia under trust fund project No. 61. The Division is currently working with the Federal Government of Somalia and UNSOM to deliver, by the end of 2017, a second briefing for members of the Somali Parliament on issues related to ocean affairs and the law of the sea, which will also allow the introduction of a gap analysis of the Somali legislative and policy framework for oceans to all relevant officials.

35. The Somali Maritime Resource and Security Strategy remains at the core of capacity-building efforts, providing a road map of implementable tasks arranged into strategic groups with lead implementers FAO, UNODC and UNSOM coordinating different agencies towards identified goals. Coordination of the process between recipients at State and regional levels is done by the Maritime Security Coordination Committee, chaired by the Federal Government and supported by IGAD through the European Union Programme to Promote Regional Maritime Security in the Eastern and Southern Africa-Indian Ocean (EU MASE). Overall coordination of the Somali

Maritime Resource and Security Strategy remains with Oceans Beyond Piracy. Coordination of the wider region's anti-piracy capacity-building beyond the waters of Somalia is undertaken by a regional capacity-building working group of the Contact Group, supported by UNODC and Oceans Beyond Piracy.

36. The Global Programme against Money-Laundering, Proceeds of Crime and the Financing of Terrorism, located within UNODC, while not focused on piracy and having a limited involvement in Somalia, has helped the Somalia Financial Reporting Center strengthen its analytical and reporting capacity, in cooperation with other United Nations teams involved in Somalia. The Global Programme agreed to conduct a financial disruption training course with the Center and the UNODC Global Maritime Crime Programme at the airport in Mogadishu during October 2017. The course will be held for Center and Somali National Intelligence and Security Agency personnel, and bring together international experts such as personnel from the United States Africa Command to focus on counter-terrorist financing and the nexus with organized criminal activities such as wildlife and environmental crime.

B. Naval activities off the coast of Somalia

37. NATO ended its Operation Ocean Shield on 16 December 2016, after more than seven years of counter-piracy patrolling in the Indian Ocean. However, NATO continued its engagement in the area, albeit in different forms, thereby lending its support to the international community's efforts to combat piracy. It retains its maritime situational awareness and close links with other international counter-piracy actors, including the NATO Shipping Centre in the United Kingdom, which regularly interfaces with the global shipping community. NATO continued its partnerships with various counter-piracy actors and remained active in counter-piracy forums such as the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction mechanism and the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. In late 2017, NATO will consider options for renewing its operational role in counter-piracy by considering the evolving piracy situation and ongoing efforts by key naval actors in the region, including EU NAVFOR and Combined Task Force 151.

38. EU NAVFOR continued to counter piracy under Operation Atalanta, which typically involves up to three warships, two maritime patrol aircraft and up to 1,000 personnel, covering an area from the Red Sea to the Arabian Sea into the Indian Ocean, down to the Mozambique Channel. EU NAVFOR was augmented in 2017 through the periodic inclusion of warships from the Republic of Korea. Operation Atalanta is home to the Maritime Security Centre-Horn of Africa, which provides maritime situational awareness in assessing vessel vulnerability, categorizing convoy and protection requirements in the Bab al-Mandab strait and the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor, releasing periodic threat assessments and assuring the shipping industry of a military response to piracy in the region.

39. EU NAVFOR continues to co-chair coordination meetings of the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction mechanism on a rotational basis with the Combined Maritime Forces, working in partnership with regional navies and independent contributors, which include China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and Turkey, among others. Since 2008, EU NAVFOR has protected ships delivering more than 1.5 million tons of World Food Programme aid to Somali ports, as well as AMISOM support vessels. No ship operating for either organization has been seized by pirates. At the end of 2016, the EU NAVFOR mandate for Operation Atalanta was extended to 31 December 2018, pending a review for commitment beyond that date.

40. During the reporting period, EU NAVFOR, the Combined Maritime Forces and NATO each continued to operate under a dedicated multinational naval counter-piracy partnership comprising 31 members with missions to protect merchant vessels and deter pirate activity in the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean, as authorized by the Security Council under its resolution 2316 (2016). The Combined Maritime Forces, operating as Combined Task Force 151, continues to patrol the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, the Somali Basin and the northern Indian Ocean. EU NAVFOR and the Combined Maritime Forces presented their latest joint threat assessment to the shipping industry at the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction meeting in Bahrain in May 2017 and to government representatives at the Contact Group meeting in Mauritius in July 2017. Both EU NAVFOR and the Combined Maritime Forces have made the assessment that, despite the recent spike in incidents in the inter-monsoon period, the tactical indicators and warnings do not point to a resurgence in piracy.

41. In addition, the naval forces of individual Member States, such as China, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Russian Federation and Turkey, continued to uphold security in the seas around Somalia by protecting and escorting commercial vessels in order to deter piracy activities. The annex to the present report lists several contributions by Member States in relation to combating piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia.

C. Improving maritime security and law enforcement

42. The Oceans Beyond Piracy report entitled "Stable sea.: Somali waters" of May 2017 shows that, while counter-piracy efforts have been largely successful as a result of issue-specific approaches on maritime governance, they address only narrow problems without fundamentally undermining or transforming the pirate networks responsible for attacks. Criminal networks are adaptive and will seek new ways to profit from poor maritime governance. As demonstrated by recent incidents (see para. 4), Somalia remains fragile and open to influence by militant and criminal networks. The disruption of onshore piracy networks and financiers is pivotal to uprooting piracy from the region. Until international and Somali stakeholders seek holistic strategies for building up the country's maritime security sector, including by improving national capacity to manage and patrol its extensive territorial waters over the long term, criminal networks can adapt to the prevailing circumstances by shifting criminal activities and operational bases to avoid international interference, guided by profit-driven motives.

43. IMO continued to assist signatory States to the Djibouti Code of Conduct in the implementation of capacity-building activities. The activities included a range of maritime security table-top contingency planning exercises aimed at highlighting the need for an integrated multi-agency approach to the implementation of maritime security measures, utilizing a range of security-related scenarios involving policy decisions and crisis/emergency management and response. IMO, in cooperation with the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre, the Saudi Arabia Border Guard, the European Union, UNODC and other entities, continued its support of regional training efforts, including maritime interdiction and coastguard training at sea.

44. During the reporting period, UNODC was appointed as the secretariat for the Law Enforcement Task Force by the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, and revived Task Force coordination meetings after a lapse of two years. The Task Force meeting was held in The Hague on 19 May 2017, and included senior investigators and prosecutors from seven countries and three international organizations. That meeting provided an opportunity for law enforcement agencies

and prosecutors from each participating State to update the group on the status of investigations and progress since the last meeting. There were investigations by multiple jurisdictions on common targets, and the Task Force meeting provided a forum for information-sharing among law enforcement agencies on the specific targets. The revived Law Enforcement Task Force plans to meet more regularly with the support of UNODC as its secretariat, and it will continue to pursue and bring to justice pirate leaders and financiers.

45. Under the European Union-funded Critical Maritime Routes Law Enforcement Agency Project, 64 Somali law enforcement personnel received training on INTERPOL policing capabilities and investigative techniques between June 2016 and June 2017. Training sessions were given to officers of the Criminal Investigative Department in Mogadishu. AMISOM, in partnership with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, who contributed 10 laptop computers, provided basic information technology equipment to the Somali federal police to enable them to work more efficiently.

46. With regard to the financing of and money-laundering by criminal networks, the projects of EU MASE and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) are currently being driven by INTERPOL in an effort to stem the parallel crime network structures that support piracy operations. Following calls by the international community to target terrorism financing, money-laundering and the support structures on which the piracy networks survive, INTERPOL designed and launched a European Union-funded project that aims to develop and enhance the financial investigative capacity of COMESA member States and Somalia. It is being implemented over a period of 18 months, with the aim of providing different levels of training and capacity-building to law enforcement agencies to combat money-laundering and terrorism financing activities stemming from maritime-related crimes. Djibouti, Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles and the United Republic of Tanzania have already observed a sharp increase in the number of relevant investigations undertaken.

47. In December 2016, EUCAP Nestor was rebranded as EUCAP Somalia and given a new, broadened civilian maritime security mandate: to assist Somalia in strengthening its maritime security capacity to enable maritime law to be enforced more effectively. EUCAP Somalia aims to advise Somali federal and regional authorities in the development of their coast guard and maritime policing functions, both on land and at sea. It provided strategic-level advice to both the National Security Office, the National Maritime Coordination Committee and the Maritime Security Coordination Committee, as well as specialized training and mentoring, including on specific rule of law and security niches such as cooperation between the police and prosecutors and on the drafting of laws to civilian maritime law enforcement agencies, the judiciary and prosecutors. Such activities ensured a focus on the development of resilient and sustainable maritime security architecture and of a national priority to establish a civilian federal coastguard model. EUCAP Somalia worked with international partners, such as UNODC and the AMISOM Marine Unit, to respond more effectively to the country's priorities and support the implementation of a comprehensive national maritime strategy, in line with the European Union Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa and the European Union Regional Action Plan 2015-2020.

D. Emerging issues in the Indian Ocean rim

48. The Department of Political Affairs took steps recently to strengthen its cooperation with the Indian Ocean Commission. Following a joint workshop in Mauritius on 8 and 9 August 2017, a draft framework of cooperation was developed to address the unique needs and maritime security challenges of African island States,

which include: the prevalence of illicit flows of narcotics (some 40 per cent of the global supply passes undetected through the area); repercussions from the rise of piracy off the coast of Somalia; and risks of violent extremism. The framework and its aligned action plan focus on the priority areas of mediation and preventive diplomacy, counter-terrorism and the prevention of violent extremism, transborder security, electoral support, and women, peace and security. The framework envisages cooperation between the two organizations and is expected to be endorsed at the next meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Indian Ocean Commission in November 2017.

49. Concerned by the emerging threat of criminality in the Indian Ocean, the Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Crime of UNODC established the Southern Route Partnership as a regional platform to counter drug trafficking at sea. In Colombo, on 29 October 2016, the Partnership convened a high-level meeting of Interior Ministers of the Indian Ocean region to counter drug trafficking, which was co-hosted by the Government of Sri Lanka and UNODC. The meeting was attended by representatives of 18 littoral States of the Indian Ocean region, including seven Ministers and Deputy Ministers for Interior/Home Affairs and special envoys and senior officials. The meeting was attended by seven international organizations/partner agencies and United Nations agencies engaged in counter-narcotics initiatives in the region. The participants discussed the development of a regional approach and cooperation to combat the growth in drug trafficking in the region. Special attention was paid to the threat of narco-criminality infiltrating Indian Ocean States. As a result, States agreed on a regional approach called the Colombo Declaration. In June 2017, the Partnership convened a meeting of the heads of drug enforcement agencies to coordinate plans for the upcoming post-monsoon period (September to November 2017).

VI. International legal and judicial issues, including human rights considerations

A. Legal frameworks

50. The signatories to the Djibouti Code of Conduct held a high-level meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, hosted by Saudi Arabia and IMO, with support from UNODC and INTERPOL. Participants adopted a revised and broadened Code of Conduct, known as the Jeddah Amendment to the Djibouti Code of Conduct, 2017. Signed by 13 States, the Jeddah Amendment addresses other illicit maritime activities that threaten regional maritime safety and security, such as the trafficking of arms, drugs and wildlife; maritime terrorism; illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing; illegal oil bunkering; crude oil theft; human trafficking; and illegal toxic waste dumping. The new agreement includes all the existing provisions of the Djibouti Code of Conduct and considers the relevant aspects of Security Council resolutions, General Assembly resolutions, Conventions, IMO guidance and regional agreements that apply to the maritime domain beyond addressing piracy and armed robbery at sea, including the need for effective maritime governance.

51. At its fifth session, in December 2016, the open-ended intergovernmental working group to elaborate the content of an international regulatory framework on the regulation, monitoring and oversight of the activities of private military and security companies of the Human Rights Council discussed the operations of those companies in maritime and other contexts (see A/HRC/WG.10/5/2). At the conclusion of its sixth session, in May 2017, the working group recommended that the Human Rights Council consider establishing a new intergovernmental working group, mandated to commence elaborating an international regulatory framework to protect human rights and ensure accountability for violations and abuses relating to the

activities of private military and security companies, informed by the discussion document presented by the Chair-Rapporteur, with further inputs from Member States and other stakeholders (see A/HRC/36/36).

B. Hostage release and support efforts

52. Since January 2016, 26 hostages have been rescued through the efforts of the Hostage Support Partnership, including the Filipino crew of the *Naham 3*, who were released after five years of captivity. The Partnership is leading efforts to obtain the release of eight Iranian hostages from the *Siraj*, who remain alive but in poor condition, having been held for more than two years in Galmudug by two separate pirate groups. In addition, several non-maritime hostages are being held by former pirate groups, including two Kenyan contractors who were captured while building a petrol station in Mogadishu and are currently being held near Xarardheere under the criminal kingpin known as "Garfanje".

53. INTERPOL continued to implement its Hostage Debriefing Initiative. Under the Initiative, 12 seafarers kidnapped and held hostage by Somali pirates from five different merchant vessels hijacked off the Horn of Africa (the *Eglantine*, the *Free Goddess*, the *Leopard*, the *Naham 3* and the *Smyrni*), were debriefed in Manila in December 2016. The debriefings were conducted by expert law enforcement personnel of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service and attended by representatives of the Philippine National Police, the Philippine Center on Transnational Crime, and the Maritime Industry Authority of the Philippines. Data obtained from debriefings were incorporated into the INTERPOL Global Database on Maritime Piracy, resulting in analytical reports on hijacking incidents that have been shared with law enforcement agencies internationally to support the prosecution of those who illicitly finance, plan, organize or unlawfully profit from pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia.

54. The International Seafarers Welfare and Assistance Network led efforts to support the families of hostages during and after captivity. A number of human rights and international labour issues remain, however, especially with regard to the responsibilities of employers for crewmembers and their families and, in particular, in situations where those vessels engage in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing off the coast of Somalia, concerns about employers requiring crews to operate in known high-risk areas.

C. Cooperation on piracy-related prosecutions

55. The timely sharing of maritime threat and risk assessments and situation awareness reports remained insufficient across all critical stakeholders. One example of the importance of the work is the recent identification of a suspect among refugees arriving in Europe from Africa who was successfully identified using the INTERPOL database of piracy suspects. Belgian prosecutors successfully convicted Mohamed Abdi Hassan, also known as Afwenye, who received a 20-year prison sentence, and his associate Mohamed Moalin-Aden, also known as Tiiceey, who received a 10-year prison sentence. The work of the Police and Piracy Intelligence Cell and the Attorney General of Seychelles led to indictments against Mohamed Garfanji, Abdukadir Mohamed (Afwenye's son) and Mohamed Abdi Hiyir, an achievement that was also noted at the meeting of the Law Enforcement Task Force in May 2017.

56. During the reporting period, a piracy prosecution readiness plan was established in Seychelles under UNODC, in partnership with EU NAVFOR and the Regional Fusion and Law Enforcement Centre for Safety and Security at Sea. That initiative

brings together the expertise and involvement of international partners to ensure that the capacity, including skills, equipment and facilities, for piracy prosecutions is further sustained and developed for the region. As a result of those efforts, Seychelles has become a leading regional prosecution centre with regard to countering maritime piracy. Belgium, India, Mauritius and Seychelles have all successfully convicted pirates in the past 12 months. The successful convictions of pirates by Member States, the repatriation of pirates to serve prison terms in Somalia and the reintegration of former pirates back into Somali society all contribute to reducing acts of piracy. The Federal Government of Somalia still requires support to complete the full development of its legal framework in order to enable it to expedite the arrest and prosecution of pirate and criminal kingpins and financiers.

VII. Observations

57. I welcome the significant progress made to date on counter-piracy efforts off the coast of Somalia. Ownership of counter-piracy measures by the Somali people is critical, since without their full support no lasting solution can be realized. Ultimately, the lasting solution to countering piracy lies onshore, through the creation of economic opportunities and alternative revenue generation for would-be pirates, together with improved prospects for current and future generations of Somali coastal communities and support for entities currently engaged in that difficult task. Somali authorities must be supported in developing a legitimate fishing economy and ending illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing by foreign fleets; building their own sustainable fisheries industry that could improve coastal livelihoods and provide relief from food shortages; and creating an alternative to piracy and other crimes. Piracy cannot be tackled in isolation from sustainable development, which includes ensuring a more stable and secure future for Somalia. The United Nations stands ready to assist the Federal Government and the people of Somalia in that regard.

58. I recognize and appreciate the collective efforts to tackle the root causes of piracy off the coast of Somalia, particularly poverty in coastal areas, and to reduce illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and the presence of foreign fishing vessels within the exclusive economic zone of Somalia, especially through the implementation of a transparent fishery licensing regime.

59. I am concerned about the incidents of piracy that have occurred over the past eight months, which were the first in five years. They are a clear reminder that the root causes of piracy have not been fully addressed either within Somalia or at sea, and that the country remains vulnerable to acts of piracy. I welcome the swift response to the incidents, particularly by Somali authorities. The limited number of incidents, however, also demonstrates the at least partial effectiveness of counter-piracy measures, including international naval presence and escorts; multinational counter-piracy operations; continued vigilance by vessels transiting the Indian Ocean and adherence to the *Best Management Practices*; and building the maritime policing and coastguard capacities of Somalia. The latter are among the best means to deny pirates opportunities and deter further attacks.

60. I appreciate the continued efforts of the Somali authorities and partners to strengthen long-term resilience against piracy, including the development of governance and judicial mechanisms for tackling piracy, as well as the ongoing efforts to revise the Somali Maritime Code and develop the new Somalia Maritime Administration Department. I also commend the work of the Law Enforcement Task Force of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, and the Indian Ocean Prosecutors Network of the Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Crime, which enables the effective prosecution of transnational maritime crime across the Indian Ocean.

Together we must strive to combat piracy by reducing related transnational organized crime, including financing, money-laundering and other support structures that piracy networks need to survive. Targeting pirate kingpins and criminal networks must remain a priority.

61. I reiterate my call to the Federal Government of Somalia to implement international standards by becoming a State party to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, strengthening its law enforcement capacity and enhancing collaboration with other countries, including on extradition agreements.

62. I reiterate my call for the immediate and unconditional release of all seafarers and other civilians held hostage in Somalia. In that regard, I commend the work of the Hostage Support Partnership. I renew my call to governments, industry and humanitarian organizations to reduce the burden on piracy survivors and their families, including through contributions to the Piracy Survivor Family Fund. I particularly commend the actions of the Chinese and Indian navies in freeing the crew of the *OS-35*.

63. I thank Seychelles for its ongoing leadership in its role as Chair of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia for 2016/17 and the Indian Ocean Commission for its role as co-host. I applaud the ongoing work of the Contact Group, international naval forces, the international community and the federal and regional authorities of Somalia for their continued efforts in fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia and around the region more generally.

64. The achievements made demonstrate high levels of local, national, regional and international cooperation in addressing piracy, which remains a threat to international peace and security.

Annex

Contributions of Member States in relation to combating piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia

Bilateral contributions to the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2246 (2015) and 2316 (2016) during the reporting period

Burundi

The Government of Burundi, with regard to the implementation of Security Council resolution 2316 (2016), has taken many actions, as set out below.

- Sponsored a study based on the International Convention for the Safety of Life At Sea and the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue.
- Is a signatory to the Djibouti Code of Conduct as at 29 January 2009.
- Established search and rescue coordination centres with an inter-ministerial risk and disaster management commission, which is the high-level body for overall coordination management across several Ministries, including the National Police of Burundi. Established a national search and rescue service to create synergies between the various players involved in crisis management at sea.
- Established a maritime port authority that includes the creation of a marine police unit responsible for regulating and controlling traffic in the transport corridors and inland waterways and for training and capacity-building.

China

Since 2008, and up to July 2017, the Navy of the People's Liberation Army of China has dispatched 26 escort task forces, involving 83 vessels and 22,000 soldiers, to carry out escort missions in these locations. The Navy has escorted about 6,400 ships, many of which were foreign or World Food Programme ships, and has helped more than 60 Chinese and foreign ships by preventing some 3,000 suspected pirate ships from launching attacks, which helped to secure this important international trade route. On 9 April 2017, the frigate *Yulin* of the 25th Chinese naval escort force received a message that the *OS-35* had been hijacked by pirates. The *Yulin* sailed towards the waters north-west of the Socotra Islands at high speed, and 16 special operations soldiers rescued 19 crew members and captured three pirates.

European Union

The European Union supports the implementation of the Somali Maritime Resource and Security Strategy and the functioning of the Maritime Security Coordination Committee.

Lithuania

Lithuania has been contributing to European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Operation Atalanta since early 2011. Starting January 2018, Lithuania will significantly increase its contribution to the Autonomous Vessel Protection Detachment that works to protect World Food Programme vessels.

Mexico

Transactions with illegal proceeds from crimes (money-laundering, including from criminal acts related to piracy) can be prosecuted under the country's Federal Criminal Code. Piracy offences, in accordance with article 146 of the Code, can be

prosecuted under Article 400 bis. Since 2004, Mexico has had a Financial Intelligence Unit attached to the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit. Its main function is to receive, analyse and disseminate information from financial reports/notices presented by the reporting entities, whether financial institutions or designated non-financial businesses and professions. Mexico is also an active participant in various intergovernmental, multilateral, regional and bilateral forums dedicated to the prevention, detection and combat of money-laundering and financing of terrorism including:

- Financial Action Task Force
- Financial Action Task Force of Latin America
- Caribbean Financial Action Task Force
- Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units

Netherlands

The Netherlands has undertaken a number of efforts to implement Security Council resolution 2316 (2016). Contributions include:

- Since 2009, supported EU NAFVOR Operation Atalanta with multiple military vessels. Also supported the European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia), which focuses on the military training of Somali National Army and advises the staff of the Somali Ministry of Defense. In 2017, contributed 15 military staff to the mission.
- Through the European Union Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity-Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Somalia), provided strategic advice and mentoring of Somali counterparts, and expanded the capacity of Somali institutions to increase stability on land and off the coast of Somalia. In 2017, contributed 10 civil experts to EUCAP Somalia.
- Contributed 15 million euros from 2014 to 2017 to the New Deal for Somalia programme for the development of basic services in the health care, education, infrastructure and security sectors.
- Contributed to the Addressing Root Causes Fund on conflict and migration root causes, through two Dutch non-governmental organization consortiums.
- Contributed 1 million euros to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime programme to develop and build prisons and judicial courts in Somalia.
- From 2010 to 2012, prosecuted and convicted 23 suspected pirates in the Netherlands; 22 were returned to Somalia.
- Provided training to African Union Mission in Somalia military forces deployed in United Nations peacekeeping missions through the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance programme of the United States of America.
- Contributed a ship to Operation Ocean Shield between 2010 and 2014.
- Contributed 6.4 million euros from 2012 to 2016 to the Somalia Stability Fund to support stability-generating actions in areas taken from Al-Shabaab.
- Supported the Federal Government of Somalia with 1.5 million euros to strengthen the capacity of the Federal Parliament in Mogadishu and the Parliaments of "Somaliland" and Puntland, and to strengthen the Somali judicial sector more generally.

Sweden

Sweden continues its support in countering piracy in the region by stationing five officers at Operation Atalanta headquarters. Parliament decided on a Swedish troop contribution to Atalanta starting in August 2017, with up to 135 military personnel. Sweden is one of the major contributors of personnel to EUCAP Somalia.

Turkey

Turkey considers piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia as a continuing threat to international security. Its active role in the area includes:

- Turkish naval vessels in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Operation Ocean Shield until its conclusion in 2016. Turkey held command of this operation (Combined Task Force 508) on a rotational basis from December 2011 to June 2012.
- Turkey was part of the Combined Maritime Forces, an initiative led by the United States, and currently commands the Combined Task Force 151 for the fifth time.
- In accordance with resolution 2244 (2015), the mission of Combined Task Force 151 has been widened to include implementation of the charcoal ban to target the financing of terrorist organizations such as Al-Shabaab.
- To date, the Turkish Navy has carried out 26 operations in areas where it has escorted the vessels of different countries, provided secure and safe passage to vessels transporting humanitarian aid to Somalia and engaged with pirates in the exercise of its mission.
- Turkey has a comprehensive approach to fighting piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia that includes humanitarian assistance and development efforts, totalling more than $500,000,000, that aim to address the root causes of the problem.

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Security Council

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Letter dated 29 September 2017 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, and in accordance with paragraph 29 of Security Council resolution 2317 (2016), I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia and on any impediments to the delivery thereto.

I would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Kairat **Umarov**
Chair
Security Council Committee pursuant
to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009)
concerning Somalia and Eritrea

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Letter dated 11 September 2017 from the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea

In accordance with paragraph 29 of Security Council resolution 2317 (2016), I have the honour to transmit the requested report on the implementation of paragraphs 28 and 29 and on any impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia.

The humanitarian community working in Somalia wishes to advise that, as with the previous 11 reports, it maintains the definition of "implementing partner" pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1916 (2010), which is as follows:

> "Implementing partner" — a non-governmental organization (NGO) or community-based organization that has undergone due diligence to establish its bona fides by a United Nations agency or another NGO and that reports when requested to the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia on mitigation measures. Implementing partners have the following characteristics:
>
> (a) The organization is part of the humanitarian response plan for Somalia (or the Somalia Humanitarian Fund) process; and/or
>
> (b) The organization is represented in a cluster's 3W matrix (*Who* does *What* and *Where*).

I remain available should you have any questions about the content of the report or need further clarification on the humanitarian situation in Somalia.

(*Signed*) Mark **Lowcock**
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs
and Emergency Relief Coordinator

Report of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator

Introduction

1. The present report is the first submission pursuant to Security Council resolution 2317 (2016), the resolution succeeding resolutions 1916 (2010), 1972 (2011), 2060 (2012), 2111 (2013), 2182 (2014) and 2244 (2015), in which the Council established the reporting requirement. It is the twelfth submission pursuant to the above-mentioned resolutions. The Council, in paragraph 29 of its resolution 2317 (2016), requested the Emergency Relief Coordinator to report to the Council by 15 October 2017 on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia and on any impediments thereto.

2. The present report covers the period from September 2016 to September 2017. It focuses primarily on the delivery of humanitarian assistance to affected people in areas under the control or influence of Al-Shabaab, which was included on the sanctions list pursuant to paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 1844 (2008), by the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, on 12 April 2010. As in the previous 11 reports (S/2010/372, S/2010/580, S/2011/125, S/2011/694, S/2012/546, S/2012/856, S/2013/415, S/2014/177, S/2014/655, S/2015/731 and S/2016/827), the present report outlines constraints to humanitarian access and operational implications. In addition, it summarizes mitigation measures established to address the risks of politicization, misuse and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance. The report is based on information synthesized in consultation with relevant humanitarian organizations active in Somalia and information from the Risk Management Unit in the Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator for Somalia.

Humanitarian situation

3. The humanitarian situation in Somalia remains precarious owing to persistent climate variability, armed conflict, clan violence, insecurity, displacement and poor access to basic services. About 6.2 million people — almost half of Somalia's population — need humanitarian assistance. Of these, 3.1 million people are in "crisis" and "emergency" situation and are unable to meet their daily food needs. Women, children and displaced persons are particularly vulnerable to shocks and mass displacement has increased protection concerns. Gender-based violence remains rampant and the recruitment and use of children by armed forces or armed groups and cases of unaccompanied/separated children are on the rise, in particular in areas with high concentrations of newly displaced persons. So far, a large-scale famine has been averted as a result of generous contributions by Somalis themselves and donors, together with scaled-up innovative response efforts by the United Nations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society and the private sector. However, the threat of famine persists, with parts of south and central Somalia remaining at particular risk. The *gu* rainy season (April-June) was shorter than usual and overall rainfall was below average in most parts of the country. The combination of poor *gu* rains and continued armed conflict have increased humanitarian concerns in parts of Galmudug and South-West states. While the rains provided respite in some areas, pastoralists in many areas lost up to 60 per cent of their animals and crop yields are generally expected to be low. As a result, most rural livelihood zones of Somalia are classified as in "crisis" and "emergency" situation. The overall nutrition situation has continued to deteriorate, with "critical"

levels of acute malnutrition in 9 of 12 internally displaced persons settlements. The prevalence of global acute malnutrition in those settlements remains above the 15 per cent emergency threshold. About 388,000 children under 5 years of age are acutely malnourished, including more than 87,000 who are severely malnourished and require urgent life-saving treatment. The drought has had a devastating effect on many water sources, with many areas experiencing acute water shortages. An estimated 4.5 million people need water, sanitation and hygiene services countrywide.

4. Major disease outbreaks continue to be reported throughout the country, with nearly 76,000 cases of acute watery diarrhoea and 15,000 suspected cases of measles registered to date in 2017. Although the prevalence of acute watery diarrhoea/cholera and measles has continued to decrease, owing in part to the preventive humanitarian response, the outbreaks are not yet fully under control. The severe drought has also further exacerbated the displacement crisis throughout the country. From November 2016 to date, the drought, compounded by armed conflict, has displaced over 875,000 persons, mainly from rural areas to urban centres. The majority of the newly displaced persons have joined the 1.1 million Somalis living in protracted displacement in various settlements throughout the country. Continued advocacy is required to provide durable solutions for such persons, whose number could increase to more than 15 per cent of the population by the end of the year. Nomadic pastoralists who have lost all their livestock present a particularly challenging case in terms of "return" or local integration. The deepening drought has also resulted in the migration of more than 5,100 Somalis to Ethiopia and Kenya in search of better opportunities. At the same time, over 31,600 Somali refugees have returned from Kenya to Somalia in 2017.

Humanitarian response

5. Early actions of solidarity and generosity by donors enabled humanitarian partners to significantly scale up response efforts and avert a famine in the first half of 2017. With more than $900 million received in 2017, including $813 million towards the Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan, operational agencies have reached over 3 million of the targeted 5.5 million people with life-saving assistance and livelihood support since March on a monthly basis. The majority of the people have been supported through cash and vouchers. More than half a million children and women were treated for malnutrition in July alone, and 377,000 people were provided with access to safe water. Nearly 2.5 million people (or 75 per cent of those targeted) were reached with improved access to food in July and close to 2.9 million people (or nearly 80 per cent of those targeted) have benefited from the provision of livestock and agricultural support during the *gu* season.

6. The Federal Ministry of Health, with support provided by humanitarian partners, launched a measles vaccination campaign in April, targeting 110,000 displaced children under 5 years of age throughout southern and central Somalia, and 250,000 children in Somaliland. Another measles campaign is planned for November. In addition, two rounds of an oral cholera vaccination campaign were conducted in Mogadishu, Kismaayo and Beledweyne in March and April, targeting 450,000 people. According to health partners, preliminary results indicate over 90 per cent coverage in areas where the campaigns took place. However, measles and other viral respiratory infections, acute watery diarrhoea/cholera and malaria are likely to spread further with the onset of the *deyr* rains in October, in particular in congested internally displaced persons settlements, owing to poor sanitation facilities and insufficient access to safe water.

7. With rapid deployment of various mechanisms, such as the Drought Operations Coordination Centres set up in Mogadishu, Baidoa and Garowe with the aim to strengthen coordination of famine prevention efforts, massive scale-up of cash programmes and enhanced coordination with federal and regional authorities, humanitarian partners have made efficient and innovative use of the available resources to prevent famine. The humanitarian community has also scaled up its logistical response capacity. In collaboration with the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service, three cargo planes were positioned in Mogadishu to facilitate the airlift of critical humanitarian supplies. The Service also scaled up the availability of passenger flights by adding a passenger plane to its fleet that services southern and central Somalia. As a result, a total of six Service aircraft currently operate within Somalia, which makes possible the scale-up of the operational response and subsequent monitoring of the projects. In addition, prioritized logistical support has been provided for the drought response by the Federal Government of Somalia. Nevertheless, critical sectors are falling short of their target and additional resources are required to continue famine prevention activities in the coming months. For example, the shelter and non-food items cluster is funded at 11 per cent and the protection sector is funded at 16 per cent.

Humanitarian access constraints and operational implications

8. Humanitarian organizations continue to operate in a difficult and risk-prone environment. As in previous years, sustained humanitarian access remains a challenge owing to multiple factors, including denial of such access by non-State armed groups, insecurity, bureaucratic impediments and limited infrastructure. Staff safety is of particular concern. The first eight months of 2017 witnessed continued violence against humanitarian workers in hard-to-reach areas in southern and central Somalia. During that period, more than 110 violent incidences impacted humanitarian organizations, including the death of 4 humanitarian workers, injury of 10, physical assault on 3, arrest and temporary detention of 17 and abduction of 25. In comparison, more than 165 violent incidences in 2016 accounted for the deaths of 14 humanitarian workers, injury of 16, arrest and temporary detention of 25, abduction of 3 and physical assault on 5 . In accordance with trends recorded in previous years, frontline responders continue to be the most affected.

9. Active hostilities, including attacks by improvised explosive device in populated areas, continued to impact humanitarian operations in southern and central regions, in particular in Baidoa in the Bay region, Beledweyne in the Hiraan region, Gaalkacyo in the Mudug region, Kismaayo in the Juba Hoose region, and in Mogadishu. Indiscriminate attacks in populated places led to deaths and injuries of civilians, including humanitarian workers, and resulted in the destruction of humanitarian facilities. For example, on 2 January 2017, a twin vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack near Mogadishu airport severely damaged the offices of several humanitarian organizations in the Peace Hotel in Mogadishu and its proximity. At least three aid workers sustained injuries in the attack. On 25 January, a humanitarian health worker was killed in a similar attack on the Dayah Hotel in Mogadishu as the victim tried to attend to those injured. Two other aid workers were injured in the same attack, which left about 30 people dead. Two other humanitarian workers were also injured on 14 June during a complex attack on the Posh Hotel in Mogadishu.

10. During the reporting period, non-State armed groups reportedly engaged in relief efforts, distributing supplies, including food and non-food items, water, nutrition and medicines, to some of the estimated 2 million people in need in areas under their control. At the same time, a number of people residing in those areas in

Bakool, Bay, Galmudug, Gedo, Juba Hoose and Juba Dhexe and Shabelle Hoose fled mainly into internally displaced persons settlements in government-controlled areas, in search of humanitarian assistance.

11. Non-State armed actors further obstructed access by humanitarian organizations and government authorities through attacks, seizure of humanitarian supplies, abductions and extortion. The number of cases involving the abduction of humanitarian workers for ransom rose considerably compared to the past three years. By the end of August 2017, a total of 25 humanitarian workers, including 4 women, were abducted by non-State armed actors in the Bay, Gedo, Hiraan and Shabelle Hoose regions. In 2016, no cases of abduction for ransom had been recorded, while in 2015, one incident had been recorded. All the abducted humanitarian workers were Somali staff members and negotiations to secure their release were brokered by their respective clans. In order to secure their release, non-State armed actors charged ransoms in the form of cash as well as weapons and ammunition. Isolated incidents involving seizure of essential relief supplies intended for drought-affected people in hard-to-reach areas were also recorded in Bakool, Bay, Galguduud, Gedo and Shabelle Hoose.

12. Non-State armed actors also maintained blockades of towns in Bakool, Bay, Gedo and Hiraan and instated a new one on Marka in Shabelle Hoose in September 2016. That action impacted the ability of the humanitarian organizations to transport supplies by road. The blockades also restricted freedom of movement of the civilian population, including its ability to access essential commercial supplies. During the period in review, non-State armed groups escalated restrictions on public transport vehicles that use the Afgooye-Marka road and, in some cases, ambushed road users. For example, on 17 May, an armed group carjacked two vehicles transporting local products from Shabelle Hoose to Mogadishu.

13. As the drought crisis worsened in early 2017, local communities in areas affected by the blockade in parts of Bakool, Bay, Gedo and Shabelle Hoose initiated negotiations with non-State armed actors to allow access for humanitarian assistance and essential commercial supplies to their drought-stricken communities. Those efforts were, however, seldom successful and areas such as Dinsoor in the Bay region and Wajid and Xuddur in the Bakool region continued to experience mounting challenges to road access. Some members of the local communities resorted to desperate measures, including smuggling essential supplies into the affected towns with donkey carts. Several incidents were reported of such donkey carts being seized and burned. For example, on 13 March, non-State armed actors seized and burned down two donkey carts that were transporting food supplies to Diinsoor. On 21 May, in a third incident of its kind within a one-month period, non-State armed actors intercepted and burned donkey carts transporting food commodities at Tuugaar Hoose village, 18 kilometres north of Diinsoor in Bay.

14. The Somali National Armed Forces and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) continued to provide armed escorts to some of the commercial transporters to support the delivery of essential supplies to communities in need, in spite of some challenges. On 9 June, through support provided by the Armed Forces and the Ethiopian National Defence Forces, Xuddur received over 20 commercial trucks carrying food supplies after 25 days of a blockade imposed by a non-State armed actor along the main supply route from Beledweyne through Qurac Joome. Previous attempts to reach the town with supplies were obstructed by ambushes and armed clashes. For example, in May, non-State armed actors ambushed commercial trucks transporting commodities from the Hiraan region. Prior to that incident, two trucks that were carrying food supplies into Xuddur had been burned. The ongoing interdiction of essential supplies destined for government-controlled areas continued

to make it difficult for assistance to reach the towns of Wajed in Bakool, Dinsoor and Qansaxdheere in Bay, Buulobarde in Hiraan and Garbaharey in Gedo.

15. The number of violent incidents associated with relief aid distributions also rose drastically in 2017. Over 33 incidents led to the deaths of 35 civilians and injury of 42 others, mainly in areas in the southern and central regions, in the contested Sool region in the north and in Somaliland. The majority of the casualties were internally displaced persons. Most of the armed violence occurred during looting or attempted looting incidents that were attributed to community members and to security forces guarding the relief supplies. The lack of proper crowd control modalities at distributions of bilateral aid donations was also a major contributing factor for the outbreaks of violence.

16. In addition to the drought that saw many of the water sources throughout the country dry up, the destruction of water wells by combatants to undermine opponents and/or perceived collaborators was particularly disturbing. For example, in January 2017, the destruction of water wells by airstrikes in the Ceel Waaq district left some pastoralist communities without access to safe water sources. The destruction of a water point at Waayo village in Afgooye on 26 January left many communities in Waayo Araq, Laanta Buur and Abdow villages without an alternative viable water source during a particularly dry period. The affected communities were left with no options other than moving to other areas in search of water.

17. The proliferation of money extortion checkpoints has continued to impact freedom of movement along all major access roads in southern and central Somalia. Varying amounts of money are charged by armed actors who man sections of the supply routes. The humanitarian community has continued to advocate with the Federal Government of Somalia, local authorities, AMISOM and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia to secure the main supply routes. Following concerted advocacy efforts, from the second quarter of 2017 to date, the Federal Government and several Federal states, including Galmudug, South-West state and Hirshabelle, have made milestone commitments and have started implementing some of the commitments to ensure that access routes are unblocked. Notably, on 8 May, the President of the Federal Government issued a directive to the Afgooye local authorities instructing the removal of illegal roadblocks along the major roads and calling for general reconciliation among the subclans inhabiting the district. The directive also ordered the suspension of tax collection within Afgooye town, with effect from 9 May 2017, for an unspecified duration. The Afgooye local authorities immediately implemented the suspension. Hirshabelle authorities in Shabelle Dhexe removed several illegal checkpoints between Mogadishu and Cadale town and committed themselves to preventing non-State armed actors from planting improvised explosive devices along the Jawhar-Balcad road. Illegal checkpoints were also removed along the Afgooye-Leego-Wanlaweyne road and Galmudug security forces, with support provided by community representatives, removed 10 illegal checkpoints imposed by armed militias near Godinlabe town in late May.

18. Troop realignment and reconfiguration by AMISOM and the Somali National Armed Forces continue to cause displacements and lead to disruption in humanitarian programming and delivery. The temporary takeovers of towns and subsequent troop withdrawals have left civilians and humanitarian organizations in the affected locations vulnerable and at risk of retaliatory attacks. Civilians remaining in these locations were reportedly subjected to retribution attacks, including apprehension, torture, killings and forced recruitments. For example, following the AMISOM withdrawal from Leego in Shabelle Hoose, on 5 August and the subsequent takeover of the town by non-State armed actors, a humanitarian organization that was running the town's health facility had two of its staff arrested,

medical and nutrition supplies and the health facility's furniture looted, and the facility occupied by the militants. Suspension, disruption and relocation of humanitarian programmes and withdrawal of humanitarian personnel linked to troop withdrawals and subsequent assumption of control of the areas by armed groups have been common during the reporting period.

19. In the absence of a centralized regulatory framework for NGOs and international organizations, disruptions, delays, intrusion in humanitarian facilities, arrests and detention of humanitarian workers, expulsion of humanitarian workers and temporary suspensions of humanitarian programmes continued to be experienced. During the first eight months of 2017, over 60 incidents were recorded throughout the country, including arbitrary taxation, multiple registration requests that included payment of multiple "registration fees", interferences in staff recruitments and contract award processes and taxation of humanitarian programme funds. Of particular concern is the increase in the number of humanitarian workers expelled from the country by the authorities and the delays in the clearance of essential humanitarian supplies at ports throughout the country. The seven expelled humanitarian personnel included both international and national staff. NGOs were more impacted compared to their United Nations counterparts. The humanitarian community continues to prioritize advocacy with the authorities to expedite the processes aimed at putting in place a centralized regulatory framework for NGOs and international organizations.

20. Despite the challenging operating environment in Somalia, humanitarian partners continue to expand their reach throughout the country. Over 257 humanitarian partners are involved in the delivery of humanitarian assistance in all 18 regions of the country. International organizations continue to contract local NGOs and community-based organizations to deliver assistance in areas where the international organizations have no access. In 2017, a broad range of actors, including local communities, stepped up to contribute to the famine prevention efforts and provided the first line of response, with support provided by local and federal authorities, business leaders, national and international humanitarian partners and charities.

Risk mitigation measures

21. The Somalia Humanitarian Fund is governed by global guidelines for country-based pooled funds in addition to the Fund's operational manual, which includes an accountability framework that outlines a set of robust risk management tools. Partners' capacity assessments are triangulated with project narrative, financial and audit reports and multiple-layer monitoring. Additional information is sourced from third-party contractors and other external sources, as well as from United Nations partners through the Risk Management Unit-convened risk management group. Altogether, this information is used to continuously assess partners' performance and to determine partners' risk levels and associated risks periodically. Furthermore, the operational manual prescribes the most appropriate funding modalities through a combined analysis of partner risk, project duration, budget amount and location of implementation to determine quality assurance measures for each project and the disbursement tranches and frequency of reporting, monitoring and financial spot checks. The existing guidance on managing possible fraud or misappropriation already facilitates amicable solutions on recovery of funds. However, seeking justice and recovering funds in more serious cases in the past, where criminal activity has been discovered, remains a challenge. The control and quality assurance measures in place have reduced the cases of possible fraud, with only three cases identified since 2013.

22. The Risk Management Unit established in 2011 provides the United Nations system and other development and humanitarian partners with the following services: facilitation, design and promotion of the adoption of the common risk management standards; provision of risk management advice; risk management training, monitoring services, maintenance and enhancement of contractors' information databases and information sharing and risk assessments and analysis for potential and existing partners. Risk assessments and analysis contain tailored recommendations designed to help agencies to address or mitigate a wide range of identified risks, including fiduciary, fraud, programme, integrity and reputational risks. The Unit continues to support the Office of Internal Oversight Services, as required, through its monitoring team and risk analysts. It developed and updated its Contractor Information Management System to enable the sharing of contract and risk-related information among the agencies of the United Nations system. As of 31 August 2017, the database contains information contributed by the Unit and 15 agencies on more than 3,875 contractors and suppliers to the United Nations in Somalia. The value of contracts covered therein amounts to about $4.7 billion. Regular updates relate to individuals and entities subject to Security Council sanctions, the World Bank exclusion list and the International Criminal Police Organization list of wanted persons for Somalia. Individuals and organizations identified in the reports by the Somalia/ Eritrea Monitoring Group are added to the database as and when required. The Unit also provides risk analysis and updates to the United Nations, World Bank and African Development Bank trust funds (Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility funds) in support of the implementation of the National Development Plan.

23. During the reporting period, the Risk Management Unit continued to regularly conduct risk management training sessions for a wide range of humanitarian organizations and other partners, including the Government and civil society. The Unit also shares information on high risk partners and collaborates with all relevant stakeholders to seek common approaches to risk management challenges and due diligence processes.

Impact of paragraphs 28 and 29 of resolution 2317 (2016)

24. Paragraph 28 of resolution 2317 (2016) provides that, until 15 November 2017, the measures imposed on Member States in paragraph 3 of resolution 1844 (2008) shall not apply to the payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources necessary to ensure the timely delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance in Somalia. While organizations surveyed for the present report did not explicitly comment on the impact of paragraphs 28 and 29 of resolution 2317 (2016) on their ability to implement programmes, the non-renewal of the humanitarian exemption would result in delays in the delivery of humanitarian assistance in areas controlled by non-State armed groups, which would put affected communities at risk of loss of lives and livelihoods and of exposure to suffering.

Conclusions

25. After close to three decades of turmoil, Somalia is currently on a positive trajectory towards peace and stability. When renewed risk of famine became apparent in early 2017, donors and operational humanitarian agencies acted early on to scale up the humanitarian response and to save lives. The extensive mobilization reflects unprecedented and timely international solidarity, which is in line with commitments made as part of the Grand Bargain at the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016. It also reflects persistent efforts by humanitarian organizations to reach

those in need, including in dangerous and insecure areas, to save lives and prevent the loss of livelihoods. Although large-scale famine has been averted to date, some communities in the most hard-to-reach areas in southern and central Somalia remain at risk of famine, and further efforts are required to ensure that the most vulnerable areas do not slip into famine in the coming months.

26. Humanitarian organizations active in Somalia continue to strike a balance between security concerns and ensuring effective service delivery under the principle of staying, protecting and delivering. Humanitarian partners also continue to seek to expand access where the needs are greatest, despite significant security challenges. The aforementioned efforts require flexible and timely funding to effectively provide assistance to millions of Somalis.

27. In the light of the foregoing, the Under-Secretary-General and Emergency Relief Coordinator invites the Security Council to renew the humanitarian exemption provided for in paragraph 28 of its resolution 2317 (2016).

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Report of the Secretary-General on women and peace and security

I. Introduction

1. Over the past 17 years, the women and peace and security agenda has become an essential component of global affairs and a tool necessary for strengthening the effectiveness of United Nations efforts in conflict prevention and resolution and humanitarian action. It is a prerequisite for the fulfilment of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Across the three pillars of the United Nations — security, human rights and development — the women and peace and security agenda contributes to transformative change. The past two decades have produced sufficient, credible evidence that women's meaningful participation measurably strengthens protection efforts, accelerates economic recovery, deepens peacebuilding efforts and leads to more sustainable peace. Growing research in recent years also points to the direct relationship between gender equality on the one hand and resilience to and prevention of conflict on the other. Despite the evidence supporting the transformative power of this agenda, the clear and detailed road map provided through the recommendations of the 2015 global study on women, peace and security, the 2015 peace and security reviews[1] and the increased need for an effective solution to growing global challenges, the actual implementation of the women and peace and security agenda continues to fall short.

2. The present report is submitted pursuant to the presidential statement dated 26 October 2010 (S/PRST/2010/22), in which the Security Council requested annual reports on the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000), resolution 2122 (2013), in which the Council called for updates on progress made across all areas of the women and peace and security agenda, highlighting gaps and challenges. It includes updates on the status of implementation of the resolution since the issuance of the previous report (S/2016/822), reflecting indicator data[2] and highlighting trends. It also provides an update on progress made pursuant to resolution 2242 (2015), which was adopted following the conduct of three peace and security reviews in 2015, with a focus on how the effective implementation of the women and peace and security agenda directly contributes to preventing conflict and sustaining peace. It

* Reissued for technical reasons on 27 October 2017.

[1] S/2016/673, S/2015/446, S/2015/490, and Radhika Coomaraswamy, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325* (United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), 2015).

[2] For the indicators, see S/2010/498, annex.

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offers a set of core, overarching and catalytic recommendations that speak to the most fundamental challenges.

3. The report is based on data and analysis provided by entities of the United Nations system, including peace operations and country teams, and inputs from Member States, regional organizations and civil society.

II. Overview of progress

4. In the previous report (S/2016/822), all stakeholders were called upon to recommit to action across five key areas: (a) bringing women's participation and leadership to the core of peace and security efforts; (b) protecting the human rights of women and girls during and after conflict; (c) ensuring gender-responsive planning and accountability for results; (d) strengthening gender architecture and technical expertise; and (e) financing the women and peace and security agenda. Each of these areas remains a priority today, and progress on each is discussed herein.

5. I am heartened by the level of reflection within the international community since 2015 on what preventing conflict and sustaining peace mean in practice and by efforts to bring inclusivity, equality and human rights to the centre of those discussions. However, our actions — especially in today's changing world — remain inadequate. The twin resolutions on sustaining peace (Security Council resolution 2282 (2016) and General Assembly resolution 70/262) underscore the importance of women's leadership and meaningful participation in the prevention and resolution of conflict and peacebuilding, recognize the need to increase the representation of women at all levels of decision-making and call for strengthened partnerships with civil society, including women's organizations and women's peace activists. To be effective, however, preventive measures need to move beyond addressing the imminence of crisis and must tackle the structural and root causes of crisis, including inequality.

6. Commitments become meaningful accomplishments, changing lives and transforming societies, only upon implementation. Efforts for peace and security, sustainable development and human rights therefore must be linked not only in words but in practice. Women peacebuilders have long carried the message of conflict prevention, calling for an end to war and acting as informal mediators and first responders. Nearly two decades ago, the movement for a stronger global focus on conflict prevention and inclusive decision-making in the context of complex global challenges of peace and security became the force behind the women and peace and security agenda. Today, evidence continues to show the foresight of this agenda, demonstrating that the sustainability of peace depends directly on the consistency of women's engagement in peace processes, politics, governance, institution-building, the rule of law, the security sector and economic recovery, and that the levels of gender equality and the security of women are among the most reliable indicators of peace.

7. Since taking office, I have pursued a transformative organizational shift towards a coordinated, robust and holistic approach to conflict prevention, rooted in gender equality, through the ongoing reform of the Organization's peace and security architecture and development and management systems along with efforts to increase gender parity and address sexual exploitation and abuse. Crucial strategies for integrating and bolstering gender equality in the conflict prevention work of the United Nations include guaranteeing women's meaningful leadership and participation, strengthening technical expertise in the area of gender equality, investing in gender and conflict analysis and ensuring adequate financing for gender

equality and women and peace and security programming. I am committed to ensuring the increased visibility and promotion of this agenda at every opportunity. In July, the Deputy Secretary-General led a joint high-level mission of the United Nations and the African Union to Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo — the first-ever mission of its kind to focus on women, peace, security and development.[3] The findings of the mission were conveyed to the Security Council the following month, and I welcome the request of Council members to make the conduct of such missions a more regular practice.

8. At the United Nations, we have begun to undertake initiatives that respond to the 2015 high-level reviews. The women's peace and humanitarian fund[4] is supporting programmes on the ground. The Security Council now holds regular expert meetings on women and peace and security and invites representatives of civil society to participate in country-specific briefings. Gender equality is given prominence in other peace and security agendas, including on preventing violent extremism and human trafficking and on youth, peace and security. I am encouraged by the proliferation of initiatives on inclusive mediation and national implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) and the tireless pursuit of justice, dignity and support for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence. These are all signs of a growing chorus in the international community of those who are appalled by the persistent and archaic political marginalization of women in decision-making on peace and security issues and who are determined to find solutions to the suffering unleashed by the recent wave of conflict and humanitarian crises.

A. Implementing the women and peace and security agenda in peace processes and in efforts to prevent the emergence and relapse of violent conflict

9. On 13 September 2017, I announced the creation of a High-level Advisory Board on Mediation, which will provide me with advice on mediation initiatives around the world. The Board is composed of 18 current and former global leaders, senior officials and renowned experts, 9 of them women. As the United Nations commits to a surge in diplomacy for peace, my mediation and conflict prevention initiatives will build on ongoing work, such as that carried out by the joint programme of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Department of Political Affairs on building national capacity for conflict prevention, that supports conflict analysis and seeks to increase the inclusivity of mediation processes as well as technical assistance, capacity-building and resources, where needed, with a view to achieving equal representation of women among national and local mediators. In my 2018 report on women and peace and security, I intend to place a special emphasis on assessing the quality of participation and representation of women in peace processes, including in the various institutions tasked with implementing peace agreements. I urge Member States to contribute information and analysis in this regard. Although such data can be challenging to track, it is essential for the improvement of strategies for sustaining peace.

10. The United Nations must support measures that increase women's participation in peace processes at all levels. At this time, inclusive processes should be the rule, not the exception. While global data on women's participation and influence in peace processes show improvement over time, the data available for 2016 indicate some concerning trends and expose ongoing barriers to the meaningful participation

[3] See S/PV.8022.

[4] Formerly the Global Acceleration Instrument for Women, Peace and Security and Humanitarian Action, as per a decision of its Funding Board in September 2017; see www.wphfund.org.

of women in mediation, ranging from women's overall participation in mediation to requests for and inclusion of gender expertise in such processes to consultations with civil society and the inclusion of gender-sensitive provisions in peace agreements. This non-linear progress highlights the need to translate good practice into standard practice and to ensure that effective mechanisms are established to ensure the meaningful measurement of results.

11. Women continue to be underrepresented among delegations to peace processes led or co-led by the United Nations and as chief negotiators, despite the existence of a normative framework for women's meaningful and equal participation and an evidence base supporting the link between women's participation and the durability of peace agreements. The number of women who have served as chief mediators remains low, although in 2016 several women appointed to senior roles assumed mediation-related and good offices functions.[5]

12. In 2016 there was a slight decrease in women's overall participation among delegations to peace processes led or co-led by the United Nations compared with the previous year. Of the 9 processes tracked,[6] senior women were represented in 11 delegations, compared with in 8 processes and 12 delegations in 2015 and 9 processes and 17 delegations in 2014. Similar to previous years, not every negotiating party included senior women delegates. Where women were represented, they were in the minority, a trend that is evident in all peace processes. For instance, at the 2016 Myanmar Union peace conference, a peace process not co-led by the United Nations, only 7 women were included in a 75-member delegation.

13. There were also fewer requests for gender expertise for those processes. In 2016, such expertise was requested and provided in only four of seven (57 per cent) applicable mediation processes led or co-led by the United Nations,[7] a decrease from 89 per cent in 2015, 67 per cent in 2014 and 88 per cent in 2013. Of the processes that did not request specific gender expertise in 2016, two included long-term engagements with the same parties for which the United Nations has provided gender expertise in previous years.[8]

14. While the improved capacity of staff and senior leadership does not replace dedicated gender expertise, the Department of Political Affairs has since 2011 been building that capacity and promoting overall awareness of gender-specific commitments, thereby providing the tools and strategies necessary for gender-sensitive mediation, including through the recent publication of Guidance on Gender and Inclusive Mediation Strategies, which offers practical strategies and tools to assist in the design of inclusive mediation strategies and the incorporation of gender-sensitive provisions in thematic areas of peace agreements. In addition, all mediation support teams backstopping ongoing peace processes led or co-led by

[5] This includes women holding positions of Deputy Special Representative (5), Special Coordinator (1) and Deputy Special Advisers (3) supporting mediation-related processes and good offices, including in Cyprus, Lebanon, Libya and West Africa.

[6] In 2016 the United Nations served as the lead or co-lead mediator in 11 mediation processes, 2 of which were established to settle border and name disputes, processes for which data are not tracked, and 9 of which were active. The active processes relate to: Cyprus; the Geneva International Discussions; Equatorial Guinea and Gabon; Guyana and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of); Libya; the Sudan (Darfur); the Syrian Arab Republic; Western Sahara; and Yemen.

[7] As two negotiations take place at the Minister/Head of State level to settle border and name disputes, the provision of gender expertise and the consultations with civil society organizations are not directly applicable.

[8] Expertise was previously requested in the long-term engagements of Western Sahara and the Geneva International Discussions.

the United Nations in 2016 included women, an accomplishment maintained since 2012.

15. Inclusive mediation processes require consultation with diverse stakeholders, including women's organizations. Yet while consultations with civil society were carried out in 100 per cent of peace negotiations led or co-led by the United Nations in 2014 and 2015, the figure dropped to 86 per cent in 2016, when such consultations were conducted in only six of seven processes.[9] Several of the consultations, however, illustrate the willingness and capacity of civil society to participate in consultations despite extremely difficult contexts. For example, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria continued to work with the women's advisory board and established a civil society support room. Through those mechanisms, the Special Envoy and senior advisers have consulted more than 130 representatives of over 500 civil society organizations. Between 30 and 40 per cent of participants in those consultations were women, and their representation increased steadily. While consultations are important for ensuring that the perspectives of Syrian society are represented at the talks being held in Geneva, they do not constitute direct participation and meaningful inclusion of women in negotiating parties' delegations to peace talks, as called for in Security Council resolution 2242 (2015). In Colombia, under its current mandate to verify the ceasefire and laying down of weapons by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia — People's Army, the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia facilitated dialogue between women's organizations and members of the monitoring and verification mechanism, building confidence in the process among local communities.

16. After consistent increases between 2010 and 2015, the percentage of signed peace agreements containing gender-specific provisions declined in 2016,[10] when only half of the six signed agreements[11] contained such provisions, as compared with 70 per cent in 2015. The average number of gender-specific provisions contained in peace agreements in 2016 was inflated because the comprehensive Colombian peace agreement contained more than 100 such provisions.[12] Although causal data are not available, women's participation and leadership in mediation efforts and gender expertise have a significant impact on the inclusion of gender-sensitive provisions in peace agreements, as demonstrated by the Colombian example.

17. One positive trend has been the initiation of national and regional networks of women mediators. In March 2017, the African Union established the African Network of Women in Conflict Prevention and Peace Mediation, also known as "FemWise". Led by Italy, the Mediterranean Women Mediators Network is expected to be launched before the end of 2017, building on the Initiative on Mediation in the Mediterranean. Emerging networks, along with existing ones such as the Nordic Women's Mediators Network, provide a resource for linking knowledge and capacity across mediation efforts locally and globally. I stress the importance of ensuring synergy and collaboration among such networks to promote mutual learning, information-sharing, sustainability and use of the expertise and resources

[9] In the Darfur (Sudan) process, no consultations with civil society took place in 2016.

[10] For the purpose of data collection, the Department of Political Affairs includes cessation-of-hostilities or ceasefire agreements and comprehensive and partial peace agreements under the term "peace agreements". These are signed by at least two parties to a conflict intending to end or significantly transform a violent conflict so that it may be addressed in a more constructive manner.

[11] Concluded in Afghanistan, Colombia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

[12] The Democratic Republic of the Congo is the only other country that signed a peace agreement with at least one provision on conflict-related sexual violence in 2016.

they provide as we strive to achieve the equal and meaningful participation of women as mediators, and requested my Senior Adviser on Policy to support efforts in that regard.

B. Protecting and promoting the rights and leadership of women and girls in mission and humanitarian settings

18. The world is facing a protection crisis. At the end of 2016 there were more than 65.5 million forcibly displaced individuals worldwide.[13] Durable solutions must be developed that address the root causes of violence and conflict, ensure meaningful and equal participation of women and support the efforts of institutions to meet the needs of all, especially those who are most at risk and the hardest to reach. Effective collaboration will require intensified action across a broad range of areas. Sexual and gender-based violence must be addressed outright and as early warning indicators of conflict and violence, and gender-sensitive protection environments must be ensured.

19. I am deeply concerned about all forms of gender-based violence, including violations against women's human rights defenders, who stand at the front lines to protect and promote the rights of women and girls and gender equality overall. Alarming accounts of threats and violence continue to emerge across regions, with individuals or groups targeted for speaking out against violations and for challenging traditional notions of family and gender roles in their societies. The repression of human rights, particularly the right of women to the enjoyment of freedom of speech, assembly and other fundamental rights, is an early warning sign of impending conflict.[14] Similarly, new research has demonstrated a correlation between rates of violence against women and outbreaks of conflict, further underscoring the need to consider the security of women and girls in conflict prevention efforts.[15] I urge Member States to develop and institutionalize protection mechanisms for defenders of women's human rights, publicly condemn violence and discrimination against them and acknowledge their critical contribution to peace and security.

Addressing conflict-related sexual violence

20. While progress towards the prevention of and response to conflict has multiplied over the past decade, conflict-related sexual violence continues to be perpetrated across diverse situational and country contexts. Dynamic investments must be made to address the root causes of conflict-related sexual violence, including the broad and interconnected dimensions of pre-existing sexual and gender-based violence and the stigma experienced by survivors of sexual violence and their children, both of which are of critical importance in the context of conflict-related displacement and population movements, as well as the abduction, trafficking, return and reintegration of women and girls.

[13] See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), "Global trends: forced displacement in 2016" (Geneva, 2017).

[14] For information regarding the correlation between high levels of repression and impending conflict see Martin Smidt and others, *The Global Conflict Risk Index (GCRI): Manual for Data Management and Product Output*, ver. 5 (European Union, 2016); and Patrick Regan and Daniel Norton, "Greed, grievance, and mobilization in civil wars", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 49, No. 3 (2005).

[15] Jocelyn Kelly, "Intimate partner violence and conflict: understanding the links between political violence and personal violence" (forthcoming and cited as a background paper) in "Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict — Main Messages and Emerging Policy Directions", World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2017.

21. In 2016, the Human Rights Council investigated and received reports of sexual and gender-based violence in the Syrian Arab Republic, Eritrea, Libya and South Sudan.[16] The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) completed a comprehensive mapping exercise that documented widespread sexual and gender-based violence and other human rights violations in the country since 2003.[17] I am encouraged that many parties are collaborating with my Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict to develop time-bound commitments to address such violations. For example, remedial action taken by Côte d'Ivoire resulted in the removal of its armed forces from the list of parties credibly suspected of committing conflict-related sexual violence (see S/2017/249, annex).

22. In my latest report on conflict-related sexual violence (S/2017/249), I brought to the Council's attention 19 situations of concern and an updated list of 46 parties to conflict credibly suspected of committing or instigating rape and other forms of sexual violence in situations of armed conflict.[18] In some settings, such as South Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic, sexual violence continues to rise to alarming levels. In others, such as Nepal and Sri Lanka, impunity for sexual violence continues to send an unacceptable message to perpetrators that their crimes will go unpunished. I reiterate that parties that are listed repeatedly in my annual reports on conflict-related sexual violence cannot participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations, and I urge Member States and the Security Council to ensure that sanctions regimes have the mandate and capacity to address such violations.

23. Investment in resources for survivors must span legal and essential services, addressing distinct vulnerabilities for those forcibly displaced and others. This necessarily includes access to mental health and psychosocial support, shelter, livelihood support, justice and reparations, and sexual and reproductive health services, including the treatment and prevention of HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted infections and the safe termination of pregnancies resulting from rape, without discrimination and in accordance with international human rights and humanitarian law. Examples of such survivor-centred programmes include the integrated multisectoral gender-based violence prevention and response programmes of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in Myanmar and the work of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in creating and enhancing medical referral systems for sexual and gender-based violence in nine countries, which gave more than 485,000 refugees and other persons of concern access to health care. More than 60 countries, international and regional organizations and non-governmental organizations have united through the Call to Action on Protection from Gender-based Violence in Emergencies. I welcome efforts to address the stigma associated with conflict-related sexual violence, such as the Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and principles on tackling stigma, launched this year.

Promoting gender-responsive protective environments

24. I am pleased that progress has been made on gender-specific recommendations for peace operations and their transition emanating from the 2015 peace and

[16] Eritrea (A/HRC/32/47), Libya (A/HRC/31/CRP.3), South Sudan (A/HRC/31/49), Syrian Arab Republic (A/HRC/31/68, A/HRC/33/55, A/HRC/31/CRP.1, A/HRC/32/CRP.2).

[17] See MINUSCA and others, "Report of the mapping project documenting serious violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Central African Republic between January 2003 and December 2015" (May 2017).

[18] That report should be read in conjunction with the eight previous reports on conflict-related sexual violence, which provide a cumulative basis for the inclusion of parties in the annexed list.

security reviews. The Departments of Political Affairs, Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support continued their efforts to build staff capacity and senior-level accountability on gender and on women and peace and security. Actions included the elevation of the head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support Gender Task Force from the Director to the Under-Secretary-General level, the establishment of a "gender in peacekeeping" dashboard to support senior leadership in monitoring progress across peace operations and targeted senior leadership training on women and peace and security commitments. Those initiatives have contributed to improved accountability in the implementation of women and peace and security mandates across peacekeeping operations. In addition, as mandated by the Security Council in its resolution 2242 (2015), specific training on gender-sensitive reporting was delivered to more than 200 staff members across missions and at Headquarters. I plan to include information on the results of those measures in the next annual report.

25. Provisions on women and peace and security are included in police and military concepts of operations and military force operations orders,[19] and gender is increasingly integrated into national predeployment training, military exercises and courses on peace operations. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support have strengthened the gender components of their core predeployment training curriculum, and revisions of department-wide policies and guidance on gender equality are under way, with the United Nations Police Gender Toolkit already extensively used by field missions.

26. Although women's representation among uniformed components of peacekeeping operations contributes to mission success,[20] women are deployed at remarkably low levels. As at 31 December 2016, women constituted 7.4 per cent of military observers and staff officers. Women's overall representation among military troops, however, remained at 4 per cent. Women constituted only 10 per cent of all police officers, with 17 per cent among individual police officers and only 7 per cent among formed police units, similar to the level in 2015.[21] However, despite the low numbers, women are being deployed as contingent commanders, and several missions now have female police and military peacekeeper networks and military gender advisers.

27. Increasing women's participation in national uniformed services may contribute to an increase in the number of women deployed in United Nations missions. Targeted outreach has increased the awareness of women officers of opportunities within the military component. For example, since 2015 more than 240 female military officers have completed two-week training courses, hosted by China, Kenya and India, with support from the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), to boost their readiness for deployment in peace operations. In 2017, Finland ran its first gender-balanced United Nations military observer course. In 2016, the Police Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations trained 750 female police officers from seven police-contributing countries, 358 of whom passed the Assessment for Mission Service test, 218 of whom were subsequently deployed. This number represented 32 per cent of individual female police officer deployments in 2016.

28. In line with the 2016 United Nations peacekeeping defence ministerial commitments, the Office of Military Affairs of the Department of Peacekeeping

[19] As at mid-2017, 100 per cent of military concepts of operations and military force operations orders and 93 per cent of police concepts of operations included women and peace and security provisions — a level reached in 2015. These data are tracked systematically.

[20] See, e.g., A/70/357-S/2015/682, para. 82.

[21] The latest data are available from www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/gender.shtml.

Operations has designated 300 posts for women only. It is a promising sign that the rank range for women military observers has expanded and the length of the tour of duty has been reduced to six months for women officers with young families. I welcome the proposal of the Military Adviser for Peacekeeping Operations to deploy mixed patrols and female engagement teams, as is done by Kenya and Zambia, as they will lead to better understanding of the needs of local communities.

29. I am encouraged by the efforts of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to develop a curriculum for senior female police officers in preparation for peacekeeping duties.

30. Stronger efforts are needed by all actors, however, to reach the global target of 15 per cent women military observers and staff officers being deployed by December 2017 and 20 per cent female police by 2020, agreed upon at the 2016 United Nations Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial Conference. I have requested the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support, UN-Women and the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, together with troop-contributing countries, to develop a dedicated strategy to significantly increase the number of women peacekeepers and police in peacekeeping missions. I urge my leadership group to take measures to address the structural barriers that limit women's meaningful participation in both the uniformed and civilian components of peacekeeping and urge Member States to look at ways of operationalizing the request of the Security Council in its resolution 2242 (2015) that incentives be adopted.

31. The gains for women and peace and security and gender equality made during the life of a mission must be safeguarded during transition as the transformative changes that ensure non-recurrence and regression into conflict. While enhanced protection functions and the designation of focal points on conflict-related sexual violence in the human rights components of peace operations have strengthened the monitoring of human rights violations targeting women and improved the coordination of monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements, robust and relevant gender analysis is an essential component of this result. The United Nations is committed to accelerating efforts to integrate gender-responsive conflict analysis and expertise in mission planning, mandate development, implementation, review, budget analysis and all mission transitions and drawdowns. Analysis that relies on high-quality disaggregated data should be included in all conflict prevention work and efforts by the United Nations, other international organizations, national actors and civil society.

32. The new generation of United Nations country teams must ensure partnership with civil society and the full integration of gender expertise, guaranteeing careful prioritization and the strategic repositioning of gender-related issues in missions to Governments and country teams. The proposed multi-partner trust fund for Liberia, for example, aims to bridge the financing gap as the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) withdraws next year and should from the outset strive to allocate a minimum of 15 per cent of all funding for gender equality and women's empowerment. Such efforts may prove to be an example for future mission drawdowns.

Addressing sexual exploitation and abuse

33. In 2016, 145 new allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse were made against United Nations staff, 80 against uniformed personnel and 65 against civilians, including staff from departments and offices of the Secretariat, agencies, funds and programmes. Those 145 allegations involved at least 311 victims, nearly all of them women and girls. Of the cases reported, 103 occurred in the context of

peace operations, and 73 of 80 allegations against uniformed personnel involved members of the military. Of the allegations related to field missions, 69 per cent were received from MINUSCA and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). Of those, 57 per cent involved sexual abuse in the form of non-consensual sexual activities with an adult or any form of sexual activity with minors.

34. Detailed information on allegations received in 2016, including against non-United Nations forces operating under a Security Council mandate, is provided in my report on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse, along with recommendations for intensified action (A/71/818). I welcome the Security Council's unprecedented step of adopting resolution 2272 (2016) on sexual exploitation and abuse. Those violations, apart from destroying lives, seriously damage and jeopardize the good work of peace missions and the Organization.

35. Eradicating sexual exploitation and abuse is a priority and one of my first orders of business. As part of a new comprehensive strategy (see A/71/818), I have committed to putting victims' rights at the forefront of United Nations efforts and am working tirelessly to end impunity for such crimes. I recently appointed the first-ever victims' rights advocate, and a trust fund was established in 2016 to support services for victims. Over the past year, under the umbrella of the Special Coordinator on Improving the United Nations Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, the United Nations upgraded and aligned tools across the system, including the development and implementation of a victim assistance protocol, the harmonization of investigation standards and complaint mechanisms and the implementation of a standardized reporting form across the United Nations system.

36. As eradicating sexual exploitation and abuse can be achieved only in partnership with Member States, at my high-level meeting on the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, held on 18 September 2017, I launched several initiatives that demonstrate this partnership. I introduced my circle of leadership, in which Heads of State and Government pledged to stand with me to end impunity, to strengthen measures to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse, to respond rapidly and decisively to credible reports and to meet the needs of victims quickly and appropriately. I also launched a voluntary compact with Member States to strengthen commitments to address sexual exploitation and abuse. I welcome the outcomes of the United Nations Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial Conference, hosted by the United Kingdom in September 2016, at which more than 60 countries pledged to adopt measures to tackle sexual exploitation and abuse perpetrated by United Nations peacekeepers.

Promoting gender equality and women and girls' empowerment in humanitarian action, including guaranteeing access to essential services

37. As at 30 June 2017, 141.1 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance, an increase from 125.3 million in 2015, as cycles of conflict and unprecedented natural and climate change-related disasters continued to have devastating effects, including massive forced displacement.[22] Gender inequality compounds the ubiquitous conflict and emergency-related obstacles to safe access to food, water, sanitation, hygiene, health care, education, employment, housing, legal identity, resources and more. Factors such as sex, age, disability, marital status, sexual orientation, gender identity, race and ethnic, religious and political identity can lead to further discrimination. Women's knowledge, community networks and leadership capacity continue to be underutilized, lessening the effectiveness of many humanitarian efforts.

[22] See www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/GHO-JuneStatusReport2017.pdf.

38. Lack of access to health-care services, including sexual, reproductive and HIV-related services, has a devastating impact on women and girls, particularly in emergency-affected settings. Data continue to show disturbing gaps, including in maternal mortality rates, which are almost twice as high as the global ratio in conflict and post-conflict countries.[23] Non-discriminatory holistic health care and other services, including sexual and reproductive health care and mental health and psychosocial support, must be delivered to women and girls in accordance with international humanitarian and human rights law.

39. Examples of such efforts in the most challenging settings include a network of maternal health clinics in South Sudan supported by the International Organization for Migration and medical and psychosocial assistance for survivors of gender-based violence provided by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in Somalia. The International Planned Parenthood Federation, through Australia's contributions, responded to 71 humanitarian crises, reaching over 890,000 people with crucial sexual and reproductive health services in 2016. Too often, insufficient resources and wavering political support undermine the effectiveness of holistic health services in these humanitarian settings. I recognize the efforts of Member States to bridge this funding gap, including through the She Decides initiative.

40. Conflicts and emergencies also limit or end girls' access to education. The gender gap in the global adjusted net enrolment rate in primary and secondary education widens significantly in conflict and post-conflict countries, and girls in conflict countries are almost two and a half times more likely to be out of school than those in non-conflict settings.[24] A basic human right, education helps protect girls and young women from violations, including human trafficking and early and child marriage. Yet less than 2.7 per cent of humanitarian funding is devoted to education.[25] I encourage efforts to fill those gaps, including such private partnerships as the Instant Network Schools programme and Education Cannot Wait, the first global fund to prioritize education in humanitarian contexts, which aims to raise $3.85 billion by 2020 to educate 75 million children living in crisis-affected countries.

41. Statelessness and unequal nationality laws drive conflict and instability and have a disparate impact on women and girls. In 26 countries, 8 of which are affected by conflict,[26] women do not have the right to confer their nationality to their children. I am alarmed by the grave situation in Myanmar, where the Rohingya are systematically denied their right to citizenship and targeted for violence, including sexual and gender-based violence.[27] In many countries hosting Syrian refugees, it remains a challenge to register children whose fathers are missing, including children born to survivors of rape, heightening their risk of statelessness.[28] I welcome such initiatives as those carried out by UNHCR in Chad, where more than 6,000 returnees from the Central African Republic have undergone biometric registration and nationality verification through a European Union-funded programme supporting returnees and helping to prevent statelessness. The African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) worked to address protection risks among internally displaced women arising from their forfeiture of

[23] See S/2016/822, para. 32.

[24] See http://gem-report-2016.unesco.org/en/gender-review/.

[25] United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), "Aid to education is stagnating and not going to countries most in need", policy paper No. 31, May 2017.

[26] Burundi, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Somalia, the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic.

[27] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Interviews with Rohingyas fleeing from Myanmar since 9 October 2016", flash report, February 2017.

[28] S/2017/249 and General Assembly resolution 70/291.

identity documents, which was a prerequisite to their receiving space to which to relocate.

42. Against the deterioration of humanitarian situations and the increase in related protection concerns globally, the implementation of the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (resolution 71/1) and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (resolution 69/283, annex II) is critical, as is the redoubling of efforts to act on the commitments made at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (see A/71/353), including by facilitating women's leadership and participation in humanitarian action, preventing and responding to gender-based violence in crisis and ensuring universal access to sexual and reproductive rights.

Implementing the women and peace and security agenda in efforts to prevent and counter terrorism and violent extremism

43. Terrorist and violent extremist groups have continued to carry out attacks against civilians, with the subjugation and exploitation of women and girls a common element across the agendas of the various groups. Because of this, the advancement of gender equality is key to stemming abuse, exploitation and recruitment by violent extremist and terrorist groups. The international community must remain steadfast in ensuring that its responses are consistent with international law and that the full implementation of the women and peace and security agenda, with its emphasis on conflict prevention and the meaningful participation of women, is integral to its response.

44. Women play critical roles in crisis prevention, working with governments and communities to build resilience. Member States and United Nations entities must improve and increase their collaboration with civil society, financing projects that address the root causes of violent extremism and terrorism and the gender dimension of the recruitment strategies of extremist and terrorist groups. This was exemplified by the consultations of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) Human Rights Unit with civil society to understand the various perspectives on violent extremism and identify existing efforts to resist patriarchy, violence, extremist narratives and instrumentalization by government actors, providing a blueprint for further action, programming in the area of women and peace and security and a direct link to preventing violent extremism.

45. At the same time, some women actively support terrorist groups, ideologically and operationally, and use their voices to legitimize violent extremist narratives. The most recent figures suggest that women make up at least 20-30 per cent of foreign terrorist fighters, with the participation of women growing to an unprecedented level.[29] While the participation of women in terrorist activities is not a new phenomenon, it is now recognized within the global framework for the prevention of violent extremism and for counter-terrorism that gender-sensitive analysis and responses are necessary for effectively achieving both aims.

46. Terrorist and violent extremist groups also manipulate gender norms and stereotypes to carry out recruitment and attacks. For example, Boko Haram has been increasingly reported to use women and girls to carry out its suicide attacks.[30] As a result, in Cameroon, Chad, the Niger and Nigeria, almost one of every five suicide

[29] See Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, "Implementation of Security Council resolution 2178 (2014) by States affected by foreign terrorist fighters", a compilation of three reports (S/2015/338; S/2015/683; S/2015/975) (2016).

[30] See S/2017/563 and S/2017/764, and Jason Warner and Hilary Matfess, "Exploding stereotypes: the unexpected operational and demographic characteristics of Boko Haram's suicide bombers", (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2017).

bombers is a child and three quarters of all child suicide bombers are girls.[31] Terrorist and violent extremist groups also utilize sexual and gender-based violence, including human trafficking, sexual slavery, forced marriage and forced pregnancy, to terrorize communities and generate revenue, as highlighted in resolution 2331 (2016).

47. I recognize the progress made through the adoption of Security Council resolution 2242 (2015) and the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (A/70/674) and the 2016 review of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/70/826 and A/70/826/Corr.1). Member States are increasingly encouraged to engage women's leadership and incorporate gender into policies and strategies for preventing and countering violent extremism and terrorism. I welcome efforts by Member States to initiate human rights-based and gender-sensitive approaches to the rehabilitation and reintegration of returnees and victims, released prisoners and suspects who qualify for alternatives to prosecution. I am encouraged by the efforts of the Office of Counter-Terrorism and the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate in supporting women's leadership and participation and the efforts of the Union for the Mediterranean, with UN-Women and UNDP, to contribute further to the evidence indicating the extent to which political marginalization and human rights abuses drive women and men into violent extremist groups.

48. I commend efforts to strengthen networks of women's civil society organizations operating in contexts of violent extremism and terrorism and to ensure that their perspectives feed into broader work on prevention and response, including that of the Women's Alliance for Security Leadership in support of innovative civil society-led efforts to prevent violent extremism.[32] The Global Solutions Exchange, launched in 2016, provides an encouraging example through its support to high-level dialogue between civil society and governments on preventing violent extremism. Several countries and organizations are implementing training and education for women as mothers, educators, law enforcement personnel and religious leaders to prevent radicalization and recruitment.[33] However, as the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has advised (A/HRC/31/65), such interventions must not "securitize" women's rights or reinforce gender stereotypes that limit women's agency or exacerbate gender inequality — which can, in turn, drive radicalization and violence and heighten the risks faced by women and girls.

C. Building inclusive and peaceful societies

49. Women peace activists of diverse ages and backgrounds are at the forefront in sustaining peace and they require support and access to maximize their vital contributions to peacebuilding. The forthcoming progress study on youth, peace and security, mandated by the Security Council in its resolution 2250 (2015), is already finding evidence, through research and consultations with young people around the world, of the unrecognized role of and multiple forms of discrimination against young women as peacebuilders. A United Nations-World Bank study stressed that high levels of gender inequality and gender-based violence in a society can be

[31] United Nations Children's Fund, "Beyond Chibok", April 2016.

[32] Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, "Uncomfortable truths, unconventional wisdoms: women's perspectives on violent extremism and security interventions", Women's Alliance for Security Leadership, brief No. 1, March 2016.

[33] Naureen Chowdhury Fink, Sara Zeiger and Rafia Bhulai, eds., "A man's world?: Exploring the roles of women in countering terrorism and violent extremism" (Hedayah and the Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2016).

associated with increased vulnerability to civil and inter-State war.[34] Research on "masculinities" is also contributing transformative recommendations towards more gender-equal and peaceful societies.[35] I note the Peacebuilding Commission's role in sustaining peace and the need for Member States to ensure strong implementation of the gender strategy adopted in 2016 and the inclusion of gender considerations into the Commission's work.

Economic recovery and access to resources

50. Women's economic empowerment has a positive effect on overall post-conflict recovery and economic growth. However, large-scale investment in post-conflict economies often focuses on infrastructure, extractive industries and commercial agriculture, where women are underrepresented or excluded. Instead, recovery targeting women often focuses on small-scale and local initiatives, including community loans, revolving credit and revenue-generating cooperatives. While such efforts can be meaningful, they should not preclude women's access to large-scale economic recovery and must actively resist any move to return to the status quo of discrimination of women with respect to access to economic resources, property, inheritance, land tenure and ownership and natural resources. The United Nations, Member States and other stakeholders must ensure that post-conflict economic recovery responds to the needs of all sectors of society and that women hold leadership positions relevant to the design and implementation of post-conflict recovery plans.

51. The Sustainable Development Goals[36] and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda[37] commit the international community to development and financing frameworks that integrate the fundamental principles of gender equality and non-discrimination. Both agendas go beyond women's right to equal participation in the economy, addressing also foreign direct investment, illicit financial and arms flows and the collection and intersectional disaggregation of data, with the Addis Ababa Action Agenda also highlighting the need for gender-responsive budgeting. I acknowledge women's efforts to ensure accountability for the crimes of transnational corporations and the proactive efforts of the United Nations, along with Member States and civil society, to transform gender inequality through economic recovery. In 2016, for example, UNDP increased the monetary benefits received by women from temporary employment in the context of early recovery programmes by more than $16 million compared with 2015, with women receiving 47 per cent of benefits in countries where disaggregated data are available, an increase from 46 per cent in 2015 and 38 per cent in 2014.[38]

Governance and women's participation in elected and non-elected bodies

52. Significant challenges concerning the inclusiveness of the electoral process remain, particularly in conflict and post-conflict settings. Structural barriers to women's participation in political processes persist at all levels, with ongoing

[34] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict* (Washington, D.C., World Bank Group, 2017).

[35] Shereen El Feki, Brian Heilman and Gary Barker, eds., *Understanding Masculinities: Results from the International Men and Gender Equality Survey — Middle East and North Africa* (Cairo and Washington, D.C., UN-Women and Promundo-US, 2017).

[36] Resolution 70/1.

[37] Resolution 69/313, annex.

[38] Covering Afghanistan, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, South Sudan, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine, Yemen and the State of Palestine. The indicator measures monetary equivalent of benefits.

challenges with respect to the investigation and prosecution of violence and assaults on or harassment of women elected officials and candidates for political office. Increasing women's participation and representation in governance and decision-making, including in national legislatures and local councils, is not only called for under the women and peace and security agenda, but also directly contributes to sustaining peace. Women's representation is consistently and positively linked to the durability of peace and perceptions of good governance.[39]

53. As at 1 July 2017, only 17 countries had elected a woman Head of State or Government, including one post-conflict country, Liberia.[40] During the past year, the global proportion of parliamentary seats occupied by women has increased slightly, from 22.9 per cent in July 2016 to 23.6 per cent in July 2017. However, the proportion in conflict and post-conflict countries has stagnated in the past two years at 16 per cent. The use of legislative quotas has promoted women's representation, especially where they are enforced. In countries where such quotas are applied,[41] women occupied 22.5 per cent of parliamentary seats, compared with 10.7 per cent in those where they are not. For example, in Somalia in 2016, following the partial implementation of a temporary special measure stipulating that 30 per cent of representatives to the House of the People must be women, representation jumped to 24.4 per cent, compared with 14 per cent following the 2012 process. Women's representation in non-elected positions also remains below gender parity; a review of public administrations in 13 conflict and post-conflict countries showed that women held an average of 21.3 per cent of decision-making positions.[42]

54. In 2016, the Department of Political Affairs, UN-Women and UNDP undertook efforts to improve the trends described above, providing technical assistance for gender-sensitive electoral processes and continuing systematic efforts to ensure that all United Nations electoral assistance policies and activities are gender sensitive. Peace operations led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations continued to support initiatives to promote women's political participation in different contexts, including in the Central African Republic and Haiti. The Electoral Assistance Division of the Department of Political Affairs, supported by United Nations partners, has continued to ensure that gender is mainstreamed in all United Nations electoral policy documents and that all needs-assessment reports include gender-specific analysis and recommendations.

55. In addition to the improved efforts to curb the negative trends described above, the international community must remain ready to effectively measure progress. National statistical systems can increase their effectiveness by increasing and improving the collection of data necessary to populate baselines for Sustainable Development Goal indicators relating to the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments and local governments (5.5.1(b)) and to proportional

[39] See, for example, Sarah Shair-Rosenfield and Reed Wood, "Governing well after war: how improving female representation prolongs post-conflict peace", in *Journal of Politics*, vol. 79, No. 3 (July 2017);and Thomas Carothers, "Democracy support strategies: leading with women's political empowerment" (Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016).

[40] In the present report, conflict and post-conflict countries include countries or territories in which a political, peacebuilding or peacekeeping mission operated during 2016, or concerning which the Security Council was seized and which had been considered by the Council at a formal meeting during the period from 1 January to 31 December 2016, or that had received programmatic funds from the Peacebuilding Fund in 2016.

[41] Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan.

[42] Reported by UNDP, "Global initiative on gender equality in public administration" (New York, 2014), drawing on 13 countries for which data are available: Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Lebanon, Mali, Nepal, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Uganda, the State of Palestine and Kosovo.

representation in public institutions (16.7.1). At present, no global baselines for these indicators exist, hindering possibilities for further research on and recognition of the contributions of local-level women leaders, including in conflict-affected settings.

Promotion of women's roles in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control

56. The past year saw the continued use of heavy and unconventional weapons, including chemical and explosive weapons, in civilian areas, with grave impacts on civilian populations, particularly in the Syrian Arab Republic. I reiterate the importance of focusing on the gender-specific effects of armed violence and the promotion of the role of women in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control to understand how illicit arms flows and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons feed a continuum of violence. Even after the conclusion of formal peace agreements, unresolved root causes of conflict and illicit financial and arms flows often fuel gang activity and alarming rates of everyday violence, including femicide.

57. On 7 July 2017, 122 Member and observer States voted to adopt the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (A/CONF.229/2017/8), a historic achievement resulting from decades of anti-nuclear-weapon campaigns, which engaged many women-led organizations and networks. At the Sixth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, held in June 2016, States noted the impact of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons on the realization of Sustainable Development Goal 5 on gender equality.

58. Both the Treaty and the Programme of Action call for the equal and effective participation of women and men. Under the Treaty, States commit to supporting women's participation in disarmament and gender-sensitive victim assistance. The third United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action, to be held in 2018, presents an opportunity to continue progress and to underscore the importance of gender considerations in the control of and reporting on the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, the need for broader participation of women in disarmament and the mandatory inclusion of gender considerations in all funding applications for the United Nations trust facility supporting cooperation on arms regulation.

59. Data on and analysis of the control of illicit small arms and light weapons often fail to capture progress towards gender-specific commitments. However, the revised reporting template for the Programme of Action will contribute to accountability through the provision of data.

60. In its resolution 2122 (2013), the Security Council called for women's full participation in gender-responsive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and in security sector reform. I welcome the Council's efforts to address those requirements in recent country-specific resolutions and call upon all peace operations with such components to ensure robust gender dynamics in the planning and implementation phases.[67] Data from disarmament and community violence reduction initiatives implemented by the United Nations in five field missions[68] in 2016 indicate that 26 per cent of participants in programmes for the reintegration of ex-combatants and youth at risk were women, up from 12 per cent in 2015 and the same share as in 2014. I acknowledge initiatives to enhance women's participation

[67] See, for example, resolutions 2295 (2016) (Mali), 2301 (2016) (Central African Republic), and *2344 (2017) (Afghanistan)*.

[68] The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), MINUSMA, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), and UNAMID.

in the area of mine action. For example, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) trained victims of explosive incidents and persons with disabilities, half of whom were women, to provide risk education in their communities.

Rule of law and access to justice

61. Structural inequalities, poverty and discrimination hinder the access of women and girls to justice and security as well as to transitional justice processes. A gender-responsive legal and judicial system constitutes one of the building blocks of a resilient society. Transitional justice mechanisms and rule of law institutions in transition and conflict contexts should be supported in addressing inequality and responding to the most urgent needs of women affected by conflict, should ensure accountability for sexual and gender-based violence, should ensure the fair administration of both formal and informal justice processes and should implement specific steps to promote women in leadership positions. National justice systems must be strengthened to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of sexual and gender-based crimes consistent with international standards and in compliance with the principles of non-discrimination. Moreover, in the prosecution of members of terrorist and violent extremist groups, consideration must be given to the gender-related nature of crimes and indeed the full body of international criminal law, including crimes against humanity and genocide, and not be limited to only the terrorist crimes themselves.

62. As judges and commissioners in transitional justice and rule of law institutions, women remain unequally represented. As at 1 July 2017, women comprised 27.7 per cent of commissioners on United Nations-supported truth commissions; in Tunisia, 5 of 11 commissioners were women; and in Mali, 5 of 25 commissioners were women. Women are also underrepresented in the recently established national criminal tribunals for conflict-related crimes, such as the Specialist Court for Kosovo, where 5 of the 25 judges appointed to the chambers are women. I encourage the Special Criminal Court in the Central African Republic to institute proactive recruitment strategies so as to ensure gender parity in staffing at all levels.[47]

63. The Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections arrangement of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UNDP, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), UNHCR, UN-Women and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has significantly improved gender mainstreaming in United Nations assistance to Member States on the rule of law, worked to ensure the inclusion of gender perspectives in joint assessments, planning, programming, resource mobilization and the rapid deployment of expertise and supported an overall culture in support of an integrated approach to women's access to justice programming. During the reporting period, the arrangement has supported the development and implementation of joint rule of law programmes with dedicated components to develop women's capacities and meet their needs in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Mali, Somalia, the Sudan (Darfur), the State of Palestine and Kosovo.[48] A significant percentage of the budget of these joint multi-year rule of law programmes has been allocated to enhance women's access to justice and to support survivors of sexual and gender-based violence in the Central African Republic (16 per cent), Mali (20 per cent), Somalia (27 per cent) and the

[47] See MINUSCA and others, "Report of the mapping project".

[48] References to Kosovo shall be understood to be in the context of resolution 1244 (1999).

State of Palestine (20 per cent), in line with the seven-point action plan for gender-responsive peacebuilding (A/65/354-S/2010/466).

64. In 2016 and 2017, Member States have made several notable contributions towards ending impunity. In 2017, Senegalese officials arrested a Guinean lieutenant, Aboubacar Diakité, for his role in crimes of sexual violence in Guinea, and officials in the Democratic Republic of the Congo arrested Ntabo Ntaberi Cheka, a rebel leader, for the mass rape of civilians in the country. UNDP has worked in Afghanistan to establish specialized courts to handle sexual and gender-based violence crimes and in Timor-Leste to support a mobile court initiative, bringing justice to those who are the hardest to reach. Moreover, MONUSCO worked to bring perpetrators of serious crimes, including crimes of sexual violence, to justice through prosecution support cells. In 2016, the Team of Experts on the Rule of Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict continued to strengthen the capacity of national rule of law and justice actors, and UN-Women and Justice Rapid Response deployed 19 experts on sexual and gender-based violence to participate in investigations and accountability processes, including to all United Nations commissions of inquiry. I encourage Member States to continue to provide gender expertise in credible investigations of rape and sexual and other forms of violence in line with international human rights standards.

65. Holistic, survivor-focused initiatives further contribute to enhancing access to justice. In Mali, for example, the Peacebuilding Fund has supported a multisectoral, survivor-centred approach to facilitating access to justice, resulting in an increase in the number of cases of sexual violence brought to court in the regions of Gao and Timbuktu, from 1 per cent to almost 14 per cent. In Somaliland, UNODC, in cooperation with the World Health Organization and UNFPA, piloted a global tool to bridge gaps between medical services and justice processes for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence, fostering coordination between the medical and legal systems. In Jordan, UNHCR supported the deployment of specialized lawyers in women's and girls' safe spaces in refugee camps, leading to improved access to justice for survivors of violence.

66. National authorities and civil society are also working with the United Nations to prevent and address sexual and gender-based violence and conflict-related sexual violence in Afghanistan, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guatemala, Iraq, Liberia, Mali, Sierra Leone, the Sudan and other countries. Such efforts include legal reform, legal assistance programmes, community security programmes, specialized services for victims and survivors of violence, awareness-raising campaigns and rehabilitation programmes. In Darfur, support was provided for the opening of a child-friendly family visiting bay in a women's prison, and in Kyrgyzstan, the participation of women in local public safety meetings led to the prioritization of sexual and gender-based violence in crime prevention plans.

67. UN-Women and the European Union jointly support gender-sensitive transitional justice in Colombia, Mali, Nepal, the Philippines and Kosovo, championing the participation of conflict-affected women and deploying gender advisers to transitional justice mechanisms. In Liberia, UNDP and OHCHR partnered with the Independent National Commission on Human Rights to strengthen the transitional justice process, commonly known as the Palava Hut programme, and increase the number of women participants. Cambodia and Germany have cooperated on a reconciliation project that involves working with survivors of forced marriage carried out during the rule of the Khmer Rouge to tell their stories through cultural activities and providing psychological support services.

D. Initiatives to monitor implementation and advance results

National accountability for commitments to women and peace and security

68. As at 31 August 2017, 68 countries or areas[47] had adopted national action plans on women and peace and security, and several other plans were in development. However, a closer analysis reveals that more than 20 national action plans have already expired or will expire soon. Moreover, of the national action plans adopted to date, only 12 have an allocated budget, and others have gaps in implementation, meaningful civil society inclusion and conflict prevention, particularly with respect to disarmament. I note efforts by Jordan and Nepal to examine the budgeting for their national action plans and urge Member States to integrate women and peace and security commitments into all national planning tools and instruments and to adopt and implement comprehensive national action plans and other frameworks on women and peace and security, with indicators to monitor progress and track allocations. I encourage countries with expired or expiring national action plans to take this opportunity to assess progress and strengthen policies, laws and programmes.

69. Currently 13 countries are implementing their second national action plan, and 7 are implementing their third. Of all current national action plans, 48 (72 per cent) have monitoring frameworks with progress indicators, and 18 (27 per cent) have designated implementation budgets, reflecting a slight increase from 25 per cent in 2016. These second- and third-generation plans are integrating emerging priorities, such as migration, climate change and violent extremism. In Nigeria, for example, the second national action plan expanded the concept of security to include issues of violent extremism, trauma and healing, disarmament and demobilization, and local or zonal action for further localization. At least seven national action plans have specifically highlighted women's roles in conflict prevention as a critical element of the women and peace and security agenda.[48]

70. The Women, Peace and Security National Focal Points Network, launched by 63 Member States last year in an initiative of Spain, had its inaugural meeting in April 2017 in Alicante, Spain (see S/2017/485). The meeting included more than 100 national focal points, government actors and civil society representatives from 61 countries discussing innovative uses of national action plans, including eliminating structural barriers to gender equality and preventing violent extremism, and civil society engagement in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of such plans.

71. Transforming the international, regional and national commitments set out in resolutions on women and peace and security into local action can further ensure that local needs and priorities inform national, regional and global policy development. Currently, 15 countries are implementing the localization programme

[47] Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, the Central African Republic, Chile, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, the Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Lithuania, Mali, Montenegro, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Paraguay, the Philippines, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Sudan, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Uganda, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, the State of Palestine and Kosovo.

[48] Those of Italy, Kenya, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Sweden, Tajikistan and the United Kingdom.

facilitated by the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders.[49] Moreover, national policies designed to promote gender equality in foreign policy and international cooperation, such as the adoption by Sweden and Canada, respectively, of a feminist foreign policy and a feminist foreign assistance policy, further demonstrate leadership and a commitment to address the root causes of gender inequality.

72. I welcome the use of human rights monitoring and reporting mechanisms to address Member State accountability for violations of women's human rights, including in conflict and post-conflict settings. In 2016, the special procedures mechanisms of the Human Rights Council sent a total of 526 communications. Of those, 79 were sent to conflict and post-conflict countries,[50] with 5 pertaining to women's rights violations. The communications regarding rights violations included allegations of killings, sexual violence, harassment and threats against women human rights defenders and judges, denial of food, politically motivated prosecutions and abductions of women and girls for sexual exploitation.

73. In 2016, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women continued to engage States regarding the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda and its general recommendation No. 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict and post-conflict situations. Also in 2016, three of the four concluding observations addressed to conflict and post-conflict countries referenced both the agenda and general recommendation No. 30, the same percentage as in 2015.[51] The Committee's concluding observations for 10 non-conflict countries in 2016 referenced the women and peace and security agenda.[52] In 2017, the Committee adopted general recommendation No. 35 on gender-based violence against women (CEDAW/C/GC/35), updating general recommendation No. 19, which draws an explicit link between gender, discrimination and conflict-related violence against women. I welcome the Arria formula meeting convened by Spain and Uruguay on 5 December 2016, which brought together members of the Committee and the Security Council to discuss the linkages between human rights and the women and peace and security agenda, in which the Committee was urged to recommend concrete actions to Member States for the implementation of women's human rights in conflict prevention and in conflict and post-conflict situations, including recommendations to non-conflict countries regarding extraterritorial obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. I encourage Member States to use the universal periodic review as an opportunity to enhance accountability for women's human rights obligations and commitments to the women and peace and security agenda.

[49] Armenia, Burundi, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Georgia, Kenya, Nepal, Liberia, the Philippines, the Republic of Moldova, Sierra Leone, Serbia, South Sudan, Uganda and Ukraine.

[50] See footnote 40 for an explanation of conflict and post-conflict countries considered in the present report. Communications were sent to Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Mali, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine, Yemen and the State of Palestine.

[51] Burundi (CEDAW/C/BDI/CO/5-6), Mali (CEDAW/C/MLI/CO/6-7), and Myanmar (CEDAW/C/MMR/CO/4-5). Haiti was also considered by the Committee, but without reference to women, peace and security (CEDAW/C/HTI/CO/8-9). See footnote 40 for an explanation of conflict and post-conflict countries considered in the present report.

[52] Armenia (CEDAW/C/ARM/CO/5-6), Canada (CEDAW/C/CAN/CO/8-9), Estonia (CEDAW/C/EST/CO/5-6), Germany (CEDAW/C/DEU/CO/7-8), Ireland (CEDAW/C/IRL/CO/6-7), Jordan (CEDAW/C/JOR/CO/6), the Netherlands (CEDAW/C/NLD/CO/6), the Philippines (CEDAW/C/PHL/CO/7-8), Rwanda (CEDAW/C/RWA/CO/7-9) and Turkey (CEDAW/C/TUR/CO/7).

74. In 2016, four conflict and post-conflict countries underwent the universal periodic review[53] and engaged on issues relating to women and peace and security, including sexual violence, women's political participation and the adoption of national action plans. In total, 10 of the 14 countries reviewed in 2016 received questions, comments, and recommendations to address legacies of conflict or violence through the women and peace and security agenda.[54]

75. National human rights institutions are also a critical link in the chain of accountability for women human rights violations and contribute to the prevention of human rights violations and conflict altogether. As at 31 July 2017, of the 31 countries and territories reviewed for the present report, 17 had national human rights institutions accredited with A or B status and two had an ombudsperson institution. This is an increase of one institution and one ombudsperson over the past year. Nine of those bodies have specific units, departments or committees dealing with issues relating to women's rights and gender equality.

Regional efforts to enhance implementation

76. At a time when the causes and effects of conflict regularly spill across borders, regional efforts for the coordinated implementation of commitments to women and peace and security are increasingly important, and I welcome opportunities for enhanced collaboration in this regard. As at 31 August 2017, 10 regional organizations had adopted dedicated implementation frameworks,[55] including regional action plans, on women and peace and security, with one new plan adopted in 2017 by the Southern African Development Community. Regional organizations provide important platforms for increased cooperation. For instance, in 2017 the African Union Commission and UN-Women, with support from Germany, launched the African Women Leaders Network, bringing together approximately 80 participants from across Africa to enhance women's leadership for a more sustainable, inclusive and peaceful continent.

77. The data available on women's representation and leadership in regional organizations indicate signs of stagnation. As at December 2016, 27 per cent of all senior posts — at Headquarters and in the field combined — in reporting organizations were occupied by women, only a slight increase over the 25 per cent reported for 2015, with mixed results across organizations. I encourage all regional organizations to enhance efforts to increase the representation of women in leadership positions within and outside their organizations.

Actions by the United Nations

78. I recognize that the United Nations must do more internally to advance the women and peace and security agenda, moving forward with efficiency, accountability and a renewed commitment to gender equality and women's representation. Currently, reporting demonstrates uneven progress in several areas, including gender parity and architecture and resource tracking and allocation for gender equality. Entities with strong specific gender policies and plans in place consistently outperform others (see, e.g., E/2017/57 and E/2017/57/Corr.1). I am

[53] Haiti, Somalia, South Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic.

[54] Haiti, Mozambique, the Niger, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of Moldova, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan, Swaziland, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste and Uganda.

[55] The African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the European Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, the League of Arab States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Pacific Islands Forum, and the Southern African Development Community.

pleased that several new initiatives already show signs of progress. I intend to introduce system-wide efforts to align and strengthen processes for the collection and analysis of gender statistics and data disaggregation to help inform policymaking and translate into planning, programming and reporting.

Representation

79. Achieving gender parity is one of the vital steps towards the realization of a United Nations where gender equality is at the foundation of its work, where operational effectiveness is enhanced and where our own standards are predicated on gender balance. I am personally committed to implementing the concrete measures outlined in my system-wide strategy for gender parity. Gender balance, including the valuing of diverse experience, must guide the composition of panels, fact-finding and assessment missions and other time-bound activities.

80. As at 31 December 2016, women made up 23 per cent of all senior-level (P-5 to Under-Secretary-General) staff in peace operations led by the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. However, only 13 per cent of Under-Secretaries-General were women, with even lower representation among special envoys. Of all active peace operations, 23 per cent were headed by women, compared with 25 per cent in both 2015 and 2014, and 18 per cent in 2010. In terms of deputy heads, the proportion of women stood at 35 per cent, an increase from 18 per cent in 2015, 24 per cent in 2014 and 15 per cent in 2010. Of the 27 resident coordinators serving in conflict and post-conflict countries at the end of 2016, 9 (33 per cent) were women, a slight increase from 29 per cent in 2015. Beyond peace operations, the proportion of Professional posts occupied by women in conflict and post-conflict duty stations remained below 50 per cent in all entities that reported data for 2016 except UN-Women, where women held 64 per cent of such posts and 75 per cent of senior-level posts. The goal should be equal levels of representation across the board.

Expertise

81. I recognize the continued need for determined implementation of the United Nations gender architecture, as well as the importance of gender advisers and women protection advisers. Dedicated technical expertise translates into normative commitments and concrete actions through strategic planning, analysis, budgeting and programme design and implementation — all critical considerations for budget negotiations taking place in the Fifth Committee for the integration of women and peace and security as a cross-cutting issue, as called for in Security Council resolutions 2122 (2013) and 2242 (2015). I am concerned that the drive for cost-effectiveness in peace operations too often leads to decreased financial support for gender equality and women and peace and security capacity, including cuts in dedicated gender posts and reduction of their seniority levels, as seen in MINUSCA, UNMIL and the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti. I have therefore asked all relevant departments of the Secretariat, including the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Political Affairs, to undertake an analysis of their institutional capacity for gender mainstreaming and present a plan for strengthening it.

82. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support have a dedicated workforce of 70 gender experts and a gender focal point mechanism in peacekeeping operations and Headquarters. As at 31 December 2016, 8 of 16 peacekeeping missions had gender units led by gender advisers[56] reporting

[56] UNAMID, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, UNMIL, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO and MINUSTAH.

to my Special Representative or Head of Mission, and 2 had gender focal points.[57] The Senior Gender Adviser post in MINUSMA, however, remains unfilled.

83. In 2016, there were 23 full-time gender advisers deployed to 8 of the 12 field-based missions led by the Department of Political Affairs, an increase from 6 out of 13 missions in 2015.[58] In addition, in 2016, two gender advisers served as part of the offices of special envoys of the Secretary-General.[59] There was a substantial increase in the overall number of gender focal points across special political missions, from 39 in 2015 to 50 in 2016.

84. I welcome efforts by both Departments to increase the visibility and responsibility of gender advisers and units within peace operations and at Headquarters, including by locating senior gender advisers in the offices of my Special Representatives. The responsibility for implementing the women and peace and security agenda in missions lies primarily with the heads of mission, but the presence of gender advisers should support gender mainstreaming in the work of all mission staff to enable more gender-responsive United Nations peacekeeping operations and special political missions. We need to continue our efforts to implement resolution 2242 (2015) to enhance cooperation among the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs and UN-Women, including by ensuring that they provide field-based gender advisers and other mission officials with full policy, substantive and technical support for the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) and successive resolutions, making full use of respective comparative advantages.

85. In 2016, 20 international and 5 national women's protection advisers were deployed to peace operations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Mali, Somalia, Sudan (Darfur) and South Sudan.[60] However, as at 30 September, 10 of 27 posts for women's protection advisers remained vacant, including those in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan; the post for Darfur has been cut.

86. In addition to the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, many other United Nations entities with a presence in conflict and post-conflict settings provide expertise on women and peace and security. For example, as at 31 December 2016, UN-Women had a country presence in 25 conflict and post-conflict countries and was implementing peace, security and humanitarian activities in 58 countries. Of the UNDP offices in such settings, 77 per cent have gender focal teams led by a senior manager, and the World Food Programme has 177 gender focal points. In 2016, 71 of the 131 United Nations country teams (54 per cent) had inter-agency working or theme groups with a focus on gender. Of those, 21 out of 28 country teams (75 per cent) active in conflict and

[57] The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.

[58] The United Nations Support Mission in Libya, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel, the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon.

[59] Namely, the Offices of the Special Envoys for the Great Lakes region and for Syria. As at 30 September 2017, the Office of the Special Envoy for Yemen had also recruited two gender advisers. Of the 25 gender advisers across field-based missions led by the Department of Political Affairs (23) and offices of special envoys (2), three are at the D-1 or P-5 level and six are at the P-4 level.

[60] In accordance with A/70/357, they carry out their responsibilities, including the establishment of and coordination on monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements on conflict-related sexual violence, from within human rights components or in cooperation with them.

post-conflict settings had such groups, an increase from 64 per cent in 2015. With proper leadership support from all country team entities, clear mandates, dedicated coordination capacity, resources and active participation by its members, those groups can serve as an important means for promoting coherence and providing strategic advice to country teams and technical support to host Governments.

Work of the Security Council

87. In 2016, there were several important innovations in the work of the Security Council in the area of women and peace and security: the convening of an informal group of experts, the inclusion of a woman civil society representative in a country-specific briefing[61] and the adoption of the first-ever resolutions devoted solely to addressing sexual exploitation and abuse (2272 (2016)) and human trafficking and sexual violence and their intersection with violent extremism (2331 (2016)).

88. In its resolution 2242 (2015), the Security Council expressed its intention to convene meetings of relevant Council experts as part of an informal expert group on women and peace and security to facilitate a more systematic approach to its work in this area and enable greater oversight and coordination of implementation efforts (see S/2016/1106). With Spain and the United Kingdom as co-chairs and UN-Women as its secretariat, the informal expert group convened nine meetings in its inaugural year, on Afghanistan,[62] the Central African Republic,[63] Iraq,[64] Mali[65] and a thematic update on sexual violence in conflict by women protection advisers from several missions.[66] In each meeting, senior peace operation and country team leadership briefed Council experts on women and peace and security concerns and discussed potential follow-up actions by the United Nations and the Council. The sharper focus and timeliness of the information and analysis have already had an impact. For example, following an informal expert group briefing on Yemen, the Council issued a presidential statement that included a recommendation from the group calling upon the parties to ensure at least 30 per cent representation of women in peace negotiations and calling upon the United Nations to report regularly on consultations with women leaders and women's organizations in line with resolution 2122 (2013) (S/PRST/2017/7). I extend my gratitude to the current co-chairs, Sweden and Uruguay, for consolidating and expanding the programme of work of the informal expert group.

89. In 2016, 38 of 77 resolutions adopted by the Security Council (49.4 per cent) referenced women and peace and security, and of the 19 presidential statements issued, 11 (57.9 per cent) included such references. The percentage of resolutions referencing women and peace and security has declined, from 64 per cent in 2015, 60.3 per cent in 2014 and 76.5 per cent in 2013. However, a study of resolutions that focused narrowly on mandate renewals for 25 country situations, 10 thematic issues and counter-terrorism found that 74 per cent of those resolutions included gender-related language and that the quality and specificity of such references had improved in general across all situations.[67]

90. It is crucial for the Security Council to maintain its focus on the women and peace and security agenda for all country-specific situations and themes. Yet,

[61] See S/PV.7824.
[62] See S/2016/673, S/2016/1059.
[63] See S/2016/672, S/2016/1105.
[64] See S/2016/683, S/2016/1104.
[65] See S/2016/682, S/2016/1103.
[66] See S/2016/1107.
[67] See Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, "Mapping women, peace and security in the UN Security Council: 2016", 13 June 2017. Available from www.womenpeacesecurity.org/resource/mapping-women-peace-and-security-in-the-un-security-council-2016/.

inconsistencies remain and I note that gender equality and women and peace and security issues continue to be neglected in emerging or deteriorating crises or when discussing counter-terrorism or the deployment of troops. Fewer than 20 per cent of all adopted resolutions contained references to the importance of and the need to ensure freedom for civil society, women's groups and women human rights defenders.[68]

91. In 2016, 154 reports were submitted or transmitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council. All 38 periodic reports on peacekeeping operations and all 26 periodic reports on special political missions contained references to women and peace and security. While analysis shows some improvement,[69] I call upon my Special Representatives and principals of United Nations entities to continue their efforts to enhance the quality of gender and conflict analysis in their reporting to the Council, including in sections on political developments and conflict dynamics. This includes improved disaggregation of data and targeted efforts to bring in the perspectives of women peacebuilders.

92. Greater attention to women and peace and security should also be evident in the work of the Security Council's subsidiary bodies. As at 30 September 2017, 7[70] (53 per cent) of 13 sanctions regimes contained sexual and gender-based violence as part of their designation criteria. In its resolution 2242 (2015), the Council committed to ensuring that the relevant expert groups for sanctions committees had the necessary gender expertise. This expertise is represented in six sanctions regimes by international humanitarian law experts, while two sanctions regimes, for Libya and for Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, have no such expertise. The public sanctions monitoring reports contain few references to women and peace and security issues.[71] The Secretariat is currently developing a training module for experts on those issues. It is important that subsidiary bodies be mandated and have the capacity to integrate women and peace and security considerations within its analysis, reporting and decisions. I urge Council members to give priority and visibility to the rights of women in the designation criteria of sanctions regimes and consider adopting thematic sanctions regimes to address such global threats as sexual and gender-based violence in conflict, human trafficking, targeted abductions and killings of women and girls and gross violations of women's rights.

93. I reiterate the importance of elevating the visibility of women and peace and security during all visiting missions of the Security Council. In 2016, the Council undertook five field missions: to Burundi and Ethiopia in January; to Mali, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal in March; to Somalia, Kenya and Egypt in May; to South Sudan and Ethiopia in September; and to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Angola in November. Four[72] of five terms of reference of the missions and three[73] of four of the briefings following the missions contained references to women and peace and security.

94. In 2016, women's civil society representatives briefed the Security Council during three open debates on women and peace and security: in March on the role of

[68] Ibid.
[69] Ibid.
[70] These are the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions regime.
[71] See S/2017/326. Some references were also included in S/2016/73 (Yemen), S/2017/639 (Central African Republic), S/2016/805 (Sudan), and S/2017/22 (Sudan).
[72] See S/2016/215, S/2016/456, S/2016/757, S/2016/948, but not S/2016/55.
[73] See S/PV.7647, S/PV.7696, S/PV.7819, but not S/PV.7615. There was no Security Council meeting on the mission to South Sudan and Ethiopia.

women in conflict prevention and resolution in Africa;[74] in June on human trafficking and conflict-related sexual violence;[75] and in October on the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda.[76] I welcome the facilitating role the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security plays in this process to ensure that civil society speakers are selected by civil society. In 2016, the Council invited, for the first time, a woman civil society representative to address it in a country-specific meeting on Liberia.[77] In the following months, six more women civil society representatives and one representative of an independent national human rights institution briefed the Council on country situations.[78] I urge Council members to build on this good practice and continue to invite women from civil society organizations to country-specific meetings to bring in more diverse perspectives and analysis of needs, priorities and solutions.

95. I encourage the Security Council to request regular briefings from the Under-Secretary-General/Executive Director of UN-Women and my Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, including on findings from relevant field missions, and to make greater use of the gender-related findings of commissions of inquiry supported by OHCHR and of the information and analysis generated by the meetings of the informal expert group and human rights treaty bodies, including the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women.

96. I call upon members of the Security Council to systematically use information on women and peace and security in deliberations and negotiations and to address specific questions to field leadership during all consultations. I urge the Council to ensure that all mission mandates reflect a stronger emphasis on women and peace and security and that sufficient resources and expertise are provided to facilitate the consistent delivery and monitoring of progress.

Financing the women and peace and security agenda

97. Conflict and related emergencies unravel years of developmental progress, disproportionately affecting women and compounding existing inequalities. Moreover, gender equality programming and expertise are often among the first to face budget cuts, and many entities still lack dedicated systems for measuring funding devoted to gender equality. There remains a dire need to reprioritize spending patterns, effectively coordinate funding instruments and explore innovative forms of flexible financing.

98. Overall, the use of gender markers for the programmatic work of United Nations entities operating in conflict and post-conflict settings has grown. The Peacebuilding Fund again exceeded the minimum 15 per cent target in 2016 and allocated 19.2 per cent of funds to gender equality and women's empowerment as a principal objective — attributable in part to improved gender mainstreaming and the innovative Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative. The Peacebuilding Fund, for the first time, directly supported civil society organizations, thereby bolstering partnerships and increasing constituencies for gender-sensitive and sustainable peace. The Peacebuilding Fund business plan (2017-2019) builds on those successes and raises the Fund's target from 15 to 30 per cent for allocations related to gender equality.

[74] See S/PV.7658.
[75] See S/PV.7704.
[76] See S/PV.7793.
[77] Liberia (S/PV.7824).
[78] Afghanistan (S/PV.7896), Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/PV.7903), Lake Chad Basin (S/PV.7861), Somalia (S/PV.7873), South Sudan (S/PV.7906), and Yemen (S/PV.7954).

99. In the case of UNDP, allocations to projects with gender equality as a principal objective stood at only 4.5 per cent, as in 2015, 2014 and 2013, which remains lower than the 6 per cent achieved in 2012. However, when taking into account UNDP projects with gender as a significant cross-cutting dimension, the figure is 46 per cent, which is above the 31 per cent observed the previous year. While UNHCR currently does not implement a tracking system, an analysis of information available through its results-based-management system indicates that approximately 11 per cent of the total operating budget for 2016 was allocated to activities having gender as a significant objective.[79] In 2016, up to 83 per cent of the humanitarian expenditure of UNICEF contributed to improving gender equality. UN-Women allocations to promote gender equality in peace, security and humanitarian action continued to increase in response to growing needs, reaching $71.42 million in 2016, of which $58.85 million went to peace and security programming and $12.57 million to humanitarian interventions.

100. The share of sector-allocable official development assistance (ODA) supporting gender equality must also be increased. In 2015, 19.4 per cent of all sector-allocable ODA was allocated to conflict and post-conflict countries, of which 40 per cent targeted gender equality. Only 5 per cent of the gender-focused sector-allocable ODA allocated to those countries was marked as having a principal focus. I welcome the commitment of Canada to ensuring that 15 per cent of all bilateral international development assistance will be targeted specifically for gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls by 2021/22 and encourage all Member States to set similar targets for the financing of gender equality. I welcome the new Spotlight Initiative, a joint effort of the European Union and the United Nations, which will invest €500 million to eliminate violence against women and girls, and encourage others to support that effort.

101. Political commitments can translate into increased funding allocations from pooled financing mechanisms and, most importantly, increased programming resources for women and peace and security. The women's peace and humanitarian fund, established after the 2015 high-level review, is an important mechanism with which to address funding gaps for women peacebuilders and the only dedicated mechanism for providing support to women and peace and security efforts. To date, the fund has supported women's organizations in Burundi, Colombia, Jordan and the Solomon Islands and the Pacific. Despite notable results, resource constraints have limited country access to the fund, with 19 of the 23 countries eligible for support yet to receive funding.

102. I welcome other trust funds in contexts affected by conflict that are integrating good practices on gender mainstreaming. In the countries under consideration in the present report, 25 multi-partner trust funds have been established since 2010. Almost all (23 out of 25) mention gender in their core documents. However, only three, the funds on Afghanistan, Colombia and Somalia, mention use of a gender marker. The international security and stabilization support strategy trust fund in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the joint peace fund in Myanmar are both developing systems to ensure gender marking and the allocation of sufficient resources to gender equality programming.

103. I call upon Member States to increase their funding for women and peace and security, including through domestic budget allocations, more gender-focused aid in conflict and post-conflict settings, direct support to civil society and the United Nations system and increased contributions to special funds, such as the women's peace and humanitarian fund, the United Nations trust fund in support of actions to eliminate violence against women, the United Nations fund for gender equality and

[79] This covers all UNHCR operations, not just those operating in conflict and post-conflict settings.

the multi-partner trust fund of United Nations Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict and the Spotlight Initiative. Given the Peacebuilding Fund's track record in financing and driving innovation with regard to gender-responsive peacebuilding and sustaining peace, I call upon all donors to the Fund to maintain and increase their contributions.

104. I call upon all multi-partner trust funds in conflict-affected and fragile settings, building on the good practices noted above, to adopt and implement my target of allocating a minimum of 15 per cent of all funding to gender equality and women's empowerment as a principal objective. Resource tracking must be accompanied by improved monitoring to ensure that increased funding for programmatic activities translates into better results for women and girls. I encourage donor countries and development banks to use targets, such as 15 per cent, to direct adequate financing towards gender equality, including targeted funding with respect to the women and peace and security agenda.

III. Concluding observations and recommendations

105. Each day that passes without a deepened resolve to prevent and cease conflict compounds the human suffering and environmental degradation described in the present report. Yet, the road to sustainable peace, the reinstatement of the rule of law, renewed public trust and strong guarantees of fundamental human rights is often long and daunting. While each context necessitates unique and creative solutions, all require the equal and meaningful participation and leadership of women, which has a demonstrated catalytic impact on the sustainability and effectiveness of peace processes, economic development and social prosperity.

106. Since 2000, the women and peace and security agenda has gained significant normative strength. Each pillar has been further operationalized for action with the three peace and security reviews of 2015, the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the 20-year review and appraisal of the implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and through dedicated regional and national policy frameworks and action plans. The Security Council has provided strong direction through its eight resolutions on women and peace and security and has mandated targeted action in country-specific and thematic resolutions, including for emerging areas. Human rights treaty bodies are also integrating the agenda into its monitoring. The frameworks and tools for implementation are in place. At this stage there is a need to shift from the ad hoc inclusion of women and peace and security and small-scale, project-based initiatives towards ensuring that women and peace and security is part and parcel of systemic change, including large-scale, transformative programmes and approaches to preventing conflict and sustaining peace.

107. Throughout the present report, I have highlighted my own commitments to implement the women and peace and security agenda, including by placing gender at the centre of my prevention platform and surge in diplomacy. My support for a transformative organizational shift towards a coordinated, robust and holistic approach to prevention includes commitments for mediation, for ending sexual exploitation and abuse and for gender parity across the Organization and at the most senior levels, including among heads and deputy heads of mission and special envoys. I commit to further addressing those areas where the United Nations is furthest behind in the representation and meaningful participation of women, including, for example, peacekeeping, where I have requested a dedicated strategy from the United Nations in consultation with troop-contributing countries to meet our outstanding targets.

108. High-quality gender and conflict analysis that relies on data that is disaggregated by gender, age and other relevant criteria must be included in all conflict prevention efforts. After 17 years of implementation, however, gaps in the availability of meaningful data remain, and gender and conflict analysis is inconsistently utilized. Ongoing global efforts to gather data and populate key indicators of the Sustainable Development Goals and improve the disaggregation of data by gender, age and other variables must be accelerated. Such efforts will contribute to improved understanding of impacts and outcomes, as well as the identification of critical gaps. I strongly encourage Member States, with the support of United Nations and other actors, to build measurement and evaluation capacity to ensure women's meaningful leadership and participation across the areas covered in the present report, including, for example, in mediation, peace processes, peacekeeping forces and governance; the design and development of humanitarian action and economic recovery; and other areas. I further encourage Member States to monitor gender equality indicators at the national level. These are strong indicators of resilience, and a sudden downward shift in women's rights is highly correlated with greater risk of conflict.

109. Improving women's access to meaningful leadership and participation in peace efforts begins with strengthened collaboration with civil society organizations, especially women-led organizations, and women peacebuilders. Women's peace activists have not only played an essential role in the creation of the agenda, but continue to carry the weight of implementation and remain the foremost experts in preventing conflict and sustaining peace. However, as highlighted in the present report, violence against women's human rights defenders persists, space continues to shrink for civil society in many parts of the world and limited opportunities for direct financial and technical support to civil society organizations remain the norm.

110. Member States and United Nations entities must invest in locally driven solutions and increase collaboration, funding and direct support to civil society organizations, including local women's organizations. Implementation cannot succeed without meaningful financial investment, targeting areas where evidence demonstrates impact. As highlighted throughout the report, the persistent funding gaps highlighted in Security Council resolution 2242 (2015) remain and, in some areas, have continued to widen, despite clear evidence that gender equality and women's empowerment leads to peaceful, just and inclusive societies. All commitments to implement the women and peace and security agenda, including national action plans and existing funding instruments, for example, cannot be effective without the necessary resources.

111. I call upon Member States to exercise global leadership and greater political will by championing the women and peace and security agenda in policies at home and abroad, fully translating symbolic commitments into practice. Gender equality and women's empowerment are prerequisites for preventing conflict, a powerful tool for sustaining peace and essential to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals, particularly Goals 5 and 16. To address the root causes of gender-based violence and inequality, we must end impunity and guarantee the full range of human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights, for all women, regardless of age, disability, marital status, sexual orientation, gender identity, race, ethnicity, religion and political affiliation. On women and peace and security, I expect the United Nations to lead and inspire by example.

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Letter dated 13 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, please find attached herewith the statement by the Islamic Republic of Iran dated 13 October 2017 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Gholamali **Khoshroo**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 13 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Islamic Republic of Iran

In the name of God, the most Compassionate, the most Merciful

Since the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iranian foreign policy has been developed and implemented based on principles of international law and international rules and conventions; respect for sovereign equality of all states and non-interference in internal affairs of others have formed the cornerstone of relations with other countries. After decades of dictatorship, dependence on foreign powers — especially the United States — and constant interference of those powers in Iran's internal affairs, the Iranian people, with their newly-established democratic government, had hoped to be able to finally build ties with neighbors based on equality and fraternity, free from political, economic and military rivalries; to form a peace-seeking nation that sought to replace enmity and bloodshed with friendship and cooperation. By contrast, the United States and its allies in the Persian Gulf region have persistently refused to accept realities of Iran and the region, and have vainly attempted to thwart the Iranian peoples' quest for democracy and self-determination.

From the very first days of the Islamic revolution, the United States adopted a hostile, interventionist and destabilizing approach towards Iran's newly-established government — with the aim of overthrowing it. The United States' bleak record — staging several coup attempts, harboring terrorists, openly supporting Saddam Hussein during the imposed war against Iran — even his use of chemical weapons against Iranians, aiding secessionist plots, downing an Iranian civil airliner, and hundreds of other conspiracies against the Islamic Republic of Iran and its people — is undeniable. Even before the Islamic Revolution, the United States sponsored a coup against the democratically-elected government of Iran in 1953, thereby showing its constant historic enmity with democracy and its support for dictators.

Terrorist groups — that have found safe haven in and plotted against the Iranian people from the United States over the past 38 years — murdered 17000 Iranians in the first few years following the Islamic Revolution. The Islamic Republic of Iran, while successfully establishing the highest standards of stability and security at home, has provided its advisory services to the people and security forces of Iraq and Syria, playing an indispensable role in combating terrorism, thwarting the Takfiri campaign to take over Damascus, Baghdad and Erbil, and helping uproot these groups from Iraq and Syria. The constructive role of our armed forces in combating terrorist groups — which the current U.S. president himself cited during his campaign as having been created by the U.S. — has been instrumental in eradicating this scourge. It is unfortunate that, instead of discarding terrorism as a tool and joining Iran's genuine counter-terrorism efforts, the United States continues to misportray these constructive efforts as destabilizing.

The role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the frontlines of combating terrorism in the region is irrefutable. The Corps, a branch of Iran's armed forces, has an impeccable track record of containing Takfiri terrorism, restoring gradual tranquility for the people of the region as well as safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and Syria. The Revolutionary Guards are regarded as national heroes for their role in the defense of Iranian territory against Saddam Hussein' army. Any action by the U.S. administration or Congress against the IRGC will constitute a strategic mistake and will draw the indignation of the

Iranian people and a strong and unified reciprocal reaction. The U.S. President will have to bear full responsibility for all consequences of his rogue behavior.

The United States has defined its interest in generating and aggravating regional disputes, and exacerbating conflict and insecurity to fuel an arms race and create bigger markets for its weapons. On the other hand, Iran has identified its regional interests with good-neighborliness, and peace and stability in the highly sensitive Persian Gulf region. This is in clear contrast with the publicly stated position of the current president of the United States, who in his campaign, publicly considered the war between Iran and Iraq as serving U.S. interests, and more recently openly made his visit to the region contingent upon the sale of hundreds of billions of "beautiful weapons" — tools of destruction that are currently being used against defenseless children and the elderly in Yemen.

The crises in our region, including in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain, are rooted in occupation, illegal military interventions, and hegemonic designs of the United States in the region. In contrast, the Islamic Republic of Iran firmly believes that its national security interests can only be secured through dialogue, confidence building and multilateral cooperation within the region, and we are determined to actively contribute to the promotion of effective regional cooperation for peace and security. Iranian proposals for political settlements to end the horrifying wars in Yemen and Syria have been welcomed by the international community, and Iran has played a constructive role in every international initiative aimed at ending regional conflicts. Iran has also cooperated with Russia and Turkey effectively to de-escalate the violence in Syria, and stands ready to contribute actively to joint efforts with the United Nations Secretary General and other responsible countries — including other permanent members of the Security Council — and the European Union, to put an end to conflicts and violence.

The hostile policies of the United States and its regional allies, especially the Zionist regime, as well as the transfer of hundreds of billions of dollars worth of arms into the region that have turned the region into a tinderbox require the Islamic Republic of Iran not to be complacent about the country's defense needs. During the war imposed on us by Saddam Hussein's regime, not only did the United States and its regional allies provide military, intelligence, logistical, economic and political assistance to Saddam, and offer their support and maintained their silence during his chemical weapons attacks campaign, they also did everything in their power to interdict the acquisition of even the most basic defensive capabilities by Iran. Through that experience we learned that in order to protect our people, safeguard our independence and security and defend our national honor, we must rely on indigenous capacities and not hesitate in developing the capability to meet the country's legitimate defense needs. It is in this framework that Iran's missile program has a purely defensive and deterrent character. Our missiles are strictly designed to carry conventional warheads and their range and precision are proportionate to our security environment and threat perception. It will continue with full force in accordance with our national defense program and is not, nor will it ever be, negotiable. When U.S. allies in the region, whose combined population is far less than Iran, each spend exponentially higher sums on their military than Iran, why shouldn't Iran — that has attacked no one in almost 300 years but has been the victim of aggression supported by the U.S. and its regional partners — acquire necessary tools of deterrence in the face the constant threats by aggressors?

The antagonistic policies of the United States against Iran have also extended to the realm of advanced science and technology in past few decades. The United States has imposed restrictions that bar scientific and technological exchanges while also imposing sanctions in these fields. These actions serve no purpose but trying to hold back our technological development and prolong dependence on advanced powers. The efforts of our young scientists to acquire the knowledge for the

development of a peaceful nuclear program has from its outset been met with propaganda, sanctions, cyber attacks and even the assassination of our scientists. Iran has repeatedly stated that it wishes to utilize nuclear energy peacefully, and that we view weapons of mass destruction — including nuclear weapons — as disruptive to peace and security, and as such they will never have a place in our military doctrine. The International Atomic Energy Agency's report and conclusion in 2015, rejecting accusations of Possible Military Dimensions (PMD), acknowledged the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear activities.

Iran has demonstrated its good will by entering into and its conclusion of nuclear negotiations with the P5+1 to resolve a fabricated crisis, and we have proven our fulfilment of our undertakings by the good-faith implementation of our commitments in accordance with the JCPOA. In contrast, the United States' fulfilment of its commitments has been lackluster and deficient from the very beginning, and in several cases — especially during the current administration — it has violated both the spirit and the letter of the JCPOA. The Islamic Republic of Iran has officially registered with the Joint Commission those violations, including failures in lifting of sanctions and policies preventing the establishment of an atmosphere necessary for normalization of trade and economic relations with Iran. The claim by the president of United States regarding Iran's non-compliance has no international relevance or credibility, since the IAEA, as the sole authority to conduct such monitoring and verification, has repeatedly confirmed Iran's full compliance with its commitments under the JCPOA. This proves once again that the United States is not a reliable negotiating partner.

The JCPOA is a valid international instrument and an outstanding achievement in contemporary diplomacy. It cannot be renegotiated or altered. The nuclear deal is not a bilateral agreement that can be annulled by unilateral action, but a deal endorsed by the international community and incorporated as a part of Security Council Resolution 2231. Other JCPOA participants, as well as the rest of the international community, should not allow the president of the United States to continue to mock and undermine the deal. The Islamic Republic of Iran will not be the first to withdraw from the deal, but if its rights and interests in the deal are not respected, it will stop implementing all its commitments and will resume its peaceful nuclear program without any restrictions.

Today, the United States is more isolated globally than ever before and the veracity of Iran's policies and positions have become evident to the international community. The world has witnessed that over the past several weeks, most countries have been unified in supporting the JCPOA and the Islamic republic and rejecting U.S. policies. The international community views Iran as a responsible actor endeavoring to promote peace and will not give any credence to rogue actors further isolating themselves every day by withdrawing from one or another international agreement and organization.

The difference between Iranian and U.S. policies on many international and regional issues are clear and undeniable. Because of their miscalculations, various U.S. administrations have aggravated these differences into open hostility against the people of Iran. In spite of all these animosities, embodied mostly in illegal threats and sanctions, the people of Iran have resiliently persisted in their quest for justice and independence. Iran has reached the pinnacles of influence and strength through relying on its own people and its indigenous capabilities, benefitting from the prudent and wise guidance of Ayatollah Khamenei, who has personified the dignity and integrity of the Iranian people, following the footsteps of the late Imam Khomeini. The new U.S. rulers must not forget the hard lessons of the past four decades; they should not forget that previous administrations — who by uttering similar fallacies put themselves in open rivalry with the Iranian people — were forced to retreat from such imprudent utterances.